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ABSTRACT 
The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the 
overwhelming use of special operations forces (SOF) in 
operational and tactical roles.  With an expected draw down 
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic 
utility of SOF, specifically on the Maritime arm of SOCOM, 
the SEALs.  SEALs bring unique capabilities based on their 
comparative advantage in direct action and their 
familiarity with the maritime domain.  This comparative 
advantage contributes to their strategic utility as a short 
duration, direct action force working from land and sea.   
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the 
organization, their recruitment, selection and training, 
has historically focused on direct action operations. 
Insistence of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets 
of these maritime commandos.   
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic 
uses of SEALs in an effort to provide guidelines to 
decision makers.   These decision makers must incorporate a 
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and 
over commitment of forces to one mission set will likely 
imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an 
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action 
based operations and best serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling 
their strategic utility.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the 
overwhelming use of special operations forces (SOF) in 
operational and tactical roles.  With an expected draw down 
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic 
utility of SOF, specifically on the Maritime arm of SOCOM, 
the SEALs.  SEALs bring unique capabilities, based on their 
comparative advantage in direct action, and their 
familiarity with maritime domain.  This comparative 
advantage contributes to their strategic utility, as a 
short duration, and direct action force working from land 
and sea.   
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the 
organization, their recruitment, selection and training, 
has historically focused on kinetic operations. Insistence 
of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets of these 
maritime commandos.   
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic 
uses of SEALs in an effort to provide guidelines to 
decision makers.   These decision makers must incorporate a 
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and 
over commitment of forces to one mission set will likely 
imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an 
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action 
based operations and best serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling 
their strategic utility.    
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A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Since their inception in 1961, Navy Sea Air Land 
(SEAL) commandos have proven themselves a capable and 
formidable fighting force.  From the actions of the SEALs’ 
forefathers, the Scouts and Raiders in World War II and the 
UDT (Underwater Demolition Teams) Frogmen of World War II 
and Korea, to the harrowing and heroic experiences in 
Vietnam, Grenada and now Afghanistan and Iraq, Navy SEALs 
have proven successful at engaging and killing the nation’s 
enemies.  Today the SEALs are part of a bigger Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW) community, which includes Special 
Boat Teams (SBTs) and SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV).  Since 
1987, NSW has fallen under the operational command of 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which has purview over 
all of the United States’ special operations forces (Army 
Special Forces, Army Civil Affairs, Army Psychological 
Operations, Army Rangers, Army 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Air Force Para-rescuemen, Air 
Force Combat Controllers, Special Operations Air Force 
fixed and rotary wing assets, Marine Special Operations 
Forces and NSW).  With these forces all contending for 
SOCOM’s missions, competition is unavoidable.  In an effort 
to remain relevant and competitive for missions, forces 
have expanded their historic mission sets.  In the current 
battle spaces of Afghanistan and Iraq, the thin line 
separating the responsibilities of various Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) has been increasingly blurred.  
What was once seen as historically Special Forces (SF) 
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missions (organizing and leading irregular forces and the 
long-term engagement of these forces) has been taken on by 
U.S. Navy SEALs.  In like manner, Special Forces are 
routinely conducting missions where SEALs have a 
comparative advantage, such as direct action raids and 
enemy snatches.  The blurred “division of labor” brings 
pointed questions as to what missions individual SOF should 
be doing.  The SF historic model of working with local 
forces fits well in the proposed “by, with, and through” 
indirect strategy, but does not comfortably mesh with 
understood strengths of the Navy SEALs.   
With the relatively new emphasis on indirect action,1 
SEALs are being called upon more often to conduct indirect 
action missions.  This begs the question, “Is this what 
they should be doing, or are they doing it merely because 
they can?” Or more to the point, what is the strategic 
utility of the U.S. Navy SEALs? 
This paper goes into detail on how the factors that 
surround the SEALs, from culture and training to their 
operational history, as well as the need for a balanced 
approach for the U.S. military, defines their strategic 
utility.   The paper also illustrates how using SEALs in 
the indirect action role, while possible, is not the most 
efficient or effective use of the force.  Based on history,  
 
 
                     
1 Indirect action are efforts to enable others to combat a defined 
enemy (in the GWOT, it is global extremism) by providing training, 
equipment, transfer of technology and ideas, humanitarian aid to the 
populace and support to the favored government.  Unconventional War 
(UW) is fought this way; defined as “Operations conducted by, with or 
through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, 
insurgency, or conventional military operations” (FM 3-05.103). 
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the SEAL ethos, normative culture and comparative 
advantage, the SEALs strategic utility is primarily as a 
direct action unit for SOCOM. 
The methodology of this paper employs case studies and 
interviews with senior NSW personnel.  This paper 
investigates the genesis of the unit, reviews its 
recruitment and training, highlights successful employment 
throughout history and the results of this employment, as 
well as misemployment of SEALs and the results, and 
validates the proposition that the comparative advantage of 
SEALs is in conducting direct action (DA) missions.  This 
comparative advantage will be established by examining SEAL 
recruitment, training, equipping, ethos, culture, and 
historical employment.   
Through a literature review and interviews with senior 
SEAL personnel, this thesis explores the best employment of 
SEALs.   Chapter II presents a brief overview of SOCOM.   
Chapter III focuses on U.S. Navy SEAL culture, and how 
this culture is a product of their ethos, recruitment, 
training, and history.  The description of training 
includes selection training, also known as BUD/S (Basic 
Underwater Demolition / SEAL school), the training required 
to qualify as a SEAL (SEAL Qualification Training or SQT) 
once a service member graduates BUD/S, and the training 
SEAL Task Units go through to prepare them for deployment.   
Chapter IV analyzes case studies of historic 
employments of SEALs—both successful and unsuccessful.  
These case studies will reveal the reasons for success or 
failure of SEAL operations. 
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Chapter V synthesizes the information presented in 
Chapter III (culture and training) with information from 
Chapter IV (case studies) in order to show the comparative 
advantage NSW forces have in Direct Action missions. 
Chapter VI discusses the strategic utility of SEALs 
and recommendations for future SEAL employment.  It looks 
at the SEALs’ maritime niche and provides prioritization of 
SEAL missions. 
Chapter VI is the conclusion and addresses the future 
for Naval Special Warfare.  Also discussed are the lessons 
learned by SEAL leadership over the past eight years.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion about the United 
State’s need to retain a single-focused direct action unit 
within SOCOM and how the U.S. Navy SEALs are a force born 
and bred for this mission  
B. STRATEGIC UTILITY 
Strategic utility is how a military directly 
contributes to the strategic outcome of a war (C. Gray, 
1996).  It is where a force can provide the most beneficial 
impact in support of their nation’s strategy.  This impact 
may be in the SOF’s ability to facilitate others to 
military success or as an effective deterrent against 
hostilities (C. Gray, 1996).  
The strategist, Colin Gray, studied the strategic 
utility of specific actions within a larger conflict.  For 
this paper, we will study strategic utility as related to 
the U.S. Navy SEALs as a force.   
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C. SOCOM AND SOF 
After the abortive and disastrous attempt to rescue 
the 53 hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran on 
April 24, 1980 legislation was passed to ensure the Army, 
Air Force and Navy paid due attention to the requirements, 
manning, training and equipping of special operations 
forces.  The resulting legislation was the Cohen-Nunn 
Amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act.  This amendment resulted in the 
creation of the Special Operations Command, more commonly 
referred to as SOCOM.  As directed by the Cohen-Nunn 
amendment, SOCOM was given responsibility for, among other 
things, training assigned forces; developing strategy, 
doctrine, and tactics; ensuring combat readiness; and the 
preparedness of special operations forces assigned to other 
unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions 
(Cohen-Nunn, 1987).   The amendment also directed Special 
Operations to be responsible for ten distinct missions.  
The directed missions were: Counter Terrorism, Special 
Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, 
Psychological Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, 
Humanitarian Assistance, Theater Search and Rescue and 
“Such other activities as may be specified by the President 
or Secretary of Defense” (Cohen-Nunn, 1987).  These 
requirements have since been modified as reflected in SOF’s 
nine core tasks published in Joint Pub 3–05.  These 
slightly modified Core Tasks are: Counter Terrorism, 
Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Unconventional 
Warfare, Psychological Operations, Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID), Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Civil Affairs, and Information Operations (see 
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Appendix for further descriptions of each mission). The 
tenth tenet is no longer stated but inherently applies.   
What had been a secondary effort by the parent 
services were now recognized fighting units with the 
capability of deploying as versatile, self-contained teams 
that provide a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) or 
a Joint Forces Commander (JFC) with an extremely flexible 
force capable of operating in “ambiguous and swiftly 
changing scenarios” (Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 
2003, p.III–1). Doctrine states that these forces can:  
• Quickly deploy to provide tailored responses. 
• Gain access to hostile or denied areas. 
• Provide limited medical support for themselves 
and those they support. 
• Communicate worldwide with organic equipment. 
• Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments 
without extensive support. 
• Survey and assess local situations and report 
these assessments rapidly. 
• Work closely with regional military and civilian 
authorities and populations. 
• Organize people into working teams to help solve 
local problems. 
• Deploy with a generally lower profile and less 
intrusive presence than larger conventional 
forces. 
• Provide unconventional options for addressing 
ambiguous situations.  
Sometime after these tenets and capabilities were 
published, the units under SOCOM deduced that it was 
necessary for each of them to be capable of executing all 
of the missions for which SOCOM was responsible.  Rather 
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than divide the responsibility among the warfighting units 
to ensure SOCOM as a whole had these capbilities, the units 
took it upon themselves to ensure they each had these 
capabilities.  This has created multi-tasked organizations, 
that while the title bears the name “Special,” in reality, 
the forces were becoming no more than elite general purpose 
forces.   
Placing the primary and secondary requirements and 
capabilities of SOF into a spectrum ranging from indirect 
action to direct action highlights the range of tasks 
required of our SOF.  Denoting the primary missions above 
the spectrum line and the secondary missions below, Figure 
1 illustrates the spectrum of special operations. 
 
Figure 1.   Spectrum of Special Operations 
In the 1990s, deploying forces to the combatant 
commands was not an overly taxing requirement for SOCOM.  
Forces were assigned to combatant commands on a fairly 
steady basis to cope with relatively few “hot” wars.  To 
properly perform their mission SOCOM ensured funding and 
equipment reached the various units falling under their 
purview (United States Special Operations Command History  
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2007).  Also, SOCOM coordinated with the various combatant 
commands to ensure the appropriate troops were assigned to 
conduct joint exercises.    
This changed drastically in 2001.  Since September 
2001, these forces are among the most deployed U.S. units 
in the GWOT.  SOCOM was initially designated as the 
“Supported Command,” ensuring America’s elite war fighters 
had a key role in the war.  This increased demand on SOF 
over the past eight years has placed a strain on the 
relatively small U.S. SOF.  With approximately 2,500 active 
duty SEALs, 4,500 active duty Special Forces, and 2,800 
Army Rangers, it became impossible to deploy these SOF 
everywhere to meet all operational requirements.  
It would be wise for SOCOM to review the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of its subordinate commands to ensure 
the efficient use of limited resources.  Taking into 
account the historic lineage, the cultural proclivity and 
the functional differentiation, a “Spectrum of Special 
Operations,” along with an appropriate division of labor, 
are illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Spectrum of Special Operations 
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This specutrum shows an efficient division of labor 
based on the specialization of the units under SOCOM.  
SEALs have shown an ability to conduct indirect action 
missions and SF has shown an ability to conduct direct 
action missions but primacy must match their individual 
comparative advantages in order to ensure the highest 
levels of readiness and force availablility.  We must, as 
Admiral Olson said, be able to respond to whatever the 
enemy throws at us.  The U.S. must have a holistic approach 
to war, allowing us to defeat our adversaries and deny them 
the the environment they need to prosper (E. T. Olson, 
Spring 2009).   
The information presented in this paper will 
illustrate why “capturing and killing adversaries will 
always be necessary” (E. T. Olson, Spring 2009) and why the 
above division of labor is the most efficient, effective 
and appropriate division labor for SOCOM units and 
specifically, why SEALs should retain their position on the 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM) TASKS 
In 1987, Congress recognized the uniqueness of special 
operations (SO) and established SOCOM (Special Operations 
Command).  It is now one ten Unified Combatant Commands.  
Composed of five subordinate commands: USASOC, 
NAVSPECWARCOM, JSOC, AFSOC, and MARSOC, its mission is to, 
“Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend 
the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize 
operations against terrorist networks.”  (USSOCOM/SOCS-HO 
2008) Congress recognized then the importance of 
specialized and appropriately trained and equipped military 
units to fight the nation’s war. 
Prior to September 11, 2001 the Unified Command Plan 
instructed USSOCOM to “organize, train, and equip SOF to 
ensure the Geographic Combatant Commander could employ SOF 
in their respective areas.”  (USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, 2008, p.16)  
In this sense, the Commander of SOCOM has historically 
acted as a “supporting command.”2  For the first time, in 
March of 2005, USSOCOM was assigned the role of “supported 
command”3  (United States Special Operations Command 
History, 2007, p.16), taking on a role: 
 
                     
2 A supporting command is one that provides necessary personnel or 
material to another command which has the lead, or is in some way has 
overall responsibility for a specified task. 
3 A supported command is one which has the lead or overall 
responsibility for a specified task.  Among other things they organize, 
synchronize and delegate what will be done to accomplish a task.  They 
are assisted by subordinate or “supporting” commands.  
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as the lead combatant commander for planning, 
synchronizing, and as directed, executing global 
operations against terrorist networks in 
coordination with other combatant commanders. 
(United States Special Operations Command History 
2007, p.17).   
Under this authority Admiral Olson, Commander of 
SOCOM, is aggressively pursuing a two-fold mission– first, 
to continue the historic role of providing forces for the 
regional combatant commanders, and second, to plan and 
synchronize the Global War on Terror amongst all Combatant 
Commanders  (Olson, 2008). 
These efforts to plan and synchronize the current war 
are proving to be a full-time and exhausting job.  
Contributing to the war in a limited, yet critical manner, 
SOF provides the strategic and operational war planner with 
flexibility and capabilities different from the 
conventional military.  SOF performs missions that either, 
no other forces in the Department of Defense (DoD) can 
conduct, or they perform tasks that other forces can 
conduct but do so in conditions and to standards not 
possible of other forces (Joint Publication 3.5, 2003, 
p.24). 
B. THEORY BEHIND SOF 
Having an understanding of what SOF can do does not 
preclude their misuse.  Joint Publication 3–05 also makes 
mention of the limitations of SOF and puts forth effort to 





Improper employment of SO resources in purely 
conventional roles or on inappropriate / 
inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of 
depleting these resources rapidly. (P.II–3) 
The document continues by stating, 
SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces 
but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional 
capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF 
can operate independently or in conjunction with 
conventional forces. SOF should not be used for 
operations whenever conventional forces can 
accomplish the mission. (Joint Publication 3–05 
2003, p.II–2) 
Employment of SOF in conventional roles is being 
witnessed more and more as the U.S. fights a war on two 
fronts.  SOFs have proven themselves capable of executing 
short duration conventional operations, but, as stated, 
special operations forces are not a substitute for 
conventional forces (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p.II–3).  
Limited personnel, increased work load, and increased 
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) have necessitated the increased 
roles SOF in the varied battle spaces.  Still, this should 
not deter political or military decision makers from 
employing SOF in purely strategic or operational roles for 
the nation.  SOF should not be used simply to replace 
conventional forces. 
Special Operations Forces were initially created to 
execute tasks that require special training and require 
familiarity with a particular type of mission (Cohen, 
1978).  Because of this specilialization and increased 
capability, SOF must be viewed and used as a strategic 
asset (Gray, 1999).  As pointed out in the military’s 
doctrine of Special Operations, Joint Publication 3–05, 
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“success by a small force against a strategic or 
operational objective usually has required units with 
combinations of special equipment, training, people, or 
tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units” 
(Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p II–1).  In this sense, SOF 
should normally be employed against targets with strategic 
or operational relevance.  To view SOF as anything but a 
strategic and/or operational asset, threatens to employ 
them outside of their intended utility, with possible 
catastrophe ensuing from this misuse. 
C. EVOLUTION OF SOF MISSIONS 
SOF missions have become diverse and varied as a 
result of deliberate legislation, historical accidents and 
a general tendency to accept any new task that does not 
fall within conventional parameters (Adams, 1998, p.303).  
This proliferation of SOF missions can be attributed to 
conventional commanders wanting to ensure success by using 
the best forces and SOF leaders always feeling a need to 
prove their relevance (Kapusta, 2000).  But this expansion 
of missions made it impossible for any one unit to remain 
exceptionally proficient in every area.  This presents SOF 
commanders with the challenge to determine where to focus 
limited resources in order to effectively prepare for the 
future (Kapusta, 2000). 
Later in this paper, we will examine instances where 
SEALs have been properly used as well as misused.  Learning 
from these cases, and recognizing that SOF is a limited 
resource, recommendations will be made on how best to 
employ SEALs for the greatest strategic utility. 
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III. SEALS 
This chapter will provide a greater understanding of 
where SEALs come from, their ethos, their training, their 
history and how they are organized as a fighting force.  
Taking these factors into account, the reader will begin to 
gain an understanding of what is arguably the direct action 
“culture” of the SEALs.  This chapter highlights the 
physical demands, the training and the lineage, which are 
all connected to a kinetic, direct action oriented force. 
A. THE CULTURE CREATED 
Culture is the process of inculcating points of view, 
biases, fundamental attitudes, and loyalties (Wilson 
1989,p.92).  Culture is to an organization as personality 
is to an individual.  An organization’s culture is 
generally passed from one generation to the next, and like 
generational culture, it changes slowly if at all (Wilson 
1989, p. 91). 
SEALs have often been described as having a “direct 
action culture.”  For years, this depiction was a matter of 
pride among SEALs and their leadership.  Recently though, 
this term has taken on an almost slanderous tone.  By 
looking at organizational culture and how the SEALs 
acquired it, it can be understood why it is so deeply 
rooted in their existence. 
In his book Organizational Culture and Leadership, 
Edgar H. Schein associates organizational culture with 
ideas such as norms, values, behavior patterns, rituals, 
traditions and symbols (Schein 1992, p.10).  Peters and 
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Waterman found that organizations with weak culture, 
unclear objectives or divergent aims performed poorly 
(Peters and Waterman 1982). Conversely, they espouse that 
the dominance of a coherent culture “proved to be an 
essential quality of ... excellent companies” and strong 
organizational culture permeates the most successful groups 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982, p.75). 
The elements of selection, training, pre-deployment 
preparation, as well the early history of the Navy SEALs 
point to an institutional importance, or organizational 
culture, of physical capability, proven physical and mental 
toughness, violence of action oriented methods and a direct 
action operational mind set.  Over the years, this action-
oriented mentality has become synonymous with the way SEALs 
conduct business.  It has become “their way of doing 
things.”  This further reinforces the idea of the SEAL 
culture, as Kotter and Heskett state in Corporate Culture 
and Performance: 
Firms with strong cultures are usually seen by 
outsiders as having a certain “style” and “way of 
doing things.” They often make their shared 
values known in a creed or mission statement and 
seriously encourage their managers to follow that 
statement (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 15). 
Kotter and Heskett further relate the widely believed 
concept that organizations with strong cultures are often 
associated with excellent performance (Kotter and Heskett, 
1992).  Such an academic accolade should give the SEALs 
more confidence and determination in retaining this direct 
action, centric way of thinking. 
Just as those within the military, but outside NSW, 
identify SEALs with this culture of battlefield violence, 
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so too do many outside the military.  This is, for the most 
part, why individuals go through the hellish rigors of 
BUD/S.  They aspire to be part of this action-oriented 
culture.  If NSW attempted to institute a community wide 
shift in culture, deep frustration and disillusionment 
could quickly follow.  If one accepts what Kotter and 
Heskett claim as essential to “excellent performance,” that 
is, a “strong culture,” then it stands to reason that an 
organization without a “strong culture” or with divided 
cultures will provide less than “excellent performance.”  
Similarly, if an individual voluntarily goes through the 
rites of initiation to be a member of an organization based 
on an espoused culture, that individual will feel roundly 
disenfranchised, if the organization alters its culture.  
Again, Kotter and Heskett address this need to fit the 
culture to the organization and the organization to embrace 
the “appropriate” culture. There is no one-size-fits-all 
“winning” culture that works well everywhere.  They assert 
a culture is only successful if it fits its environment, 
and the better the fit of the culture to the strategic 
goals the better the organization’s performance.  This 
concept of “fit” and organizational performance is 
manifested in the statement, “The better the [cultural] fit 
the better the performance; the poorer the fit the poorer 
the performance” (Kotter and Hesker, p.28). 
When an organization has a widely accepted culture, 
that organization has a sense of mission.  A sense of 
mission gives members a sense of special worth and provides 
a basis for recruitment (Wilson, 1989).  If NSW was to 
adopt a non-kinetic, indirect action oriented mission set, 
and therefore, aspire to a non-direct action culture, it 
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would assuredly contribute to an organizational 
schizophrenia.  If two cultures struggle under this 
organization, one will dominate the other, and the 
dominated culture will become a subordinated step-child 
(Wilson, 1989).  As history has shown, it would be 
difficult to balance or assimilate the culture of a hunting 
society to that of a cultivating society.  It may not be 
impossible, but it will take generations to purge the 
traditions, reinvent the values, and instill the behavior 
patterns in order to redirect the deep rooted culture. 
B. SEAL ETHOS 
United States Navy SEAL 
In times of war or uncertainty there is a special 
breed of warrior ready to answer our Nation’s 
call. A common man with uncommon desire to 
succeed. Forged by adversity, he stands alongside 
America’s finest special operations forces to 
serve his country, the American people, and 
protect their way of life. I am that man. 
My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage. 
Bestowed upon me by the heroes that have gone 
before, it embodies the trust of those I have 
sworn to protect. By wearing the Trident I accept 
the responsibility of my chosen profession and 
way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn 
every day.  
My loyalty to Country and Team is beyond 
reproach. I humbly serve as a guardian to my 
fellow Americans always ready to defend those who 
are unable to defend themselves. I do not 
advertise the nature of my work, nor seek 
recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept 
the inherent hazards of my profession, placing 
the welfare and security of others before my own. 
I serve with honor on and off the battlefield. 
The ability to control my emotions and my 
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actions, regardless of circumstance, sets me 
apart from other men.  Uncompromising integrity 
is my standard. My character and honor are 
steadfast. My word is my bond. 
We expect to lead and be led. In the absence of 
orders I will take charge, lead my teammates and 
accomplish the mission. I lead by example in all 
situations. 
I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on 
adversity. My Nation expects me to be physically 
harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If 
knocked down, I will get back up, every time.  I 
will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to 
protect my teammates and to accomplish our 
mission. I am never out of the fight. 
We demand discipline. We expect innovation. The 
lives of my teammates and the success of our 
mission depend on me—my technical skill, tactical 
proficiency, and attention to detail. My training 
is never complete. 
We train for war and fight to win. I stand ready 
to bring the full spectrum of combat power to 
bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals 
established by my country. The execution of my 
duties will be swift and violent when required 
yet guided by the very principles that I serve to 
defend. 
Brave men have fought and died building the proud 
tradition and feared reputation that I am bound 
to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the legacy 
of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently 
guides my every deed. I will not fail.        
(Navy SEAL home page, 2008) 
Although relatively new, this ethos attempts, and 
succeeds, in tying today’s newly “pinned” SEAL to the first 
SEAL, and even to the birth of Navy Special Warfare in 
WWII.  This ethos is an attempt to encapsulate all a SEAL 
is and stands for in nine succinct paragraphs.  It is an 
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admission of NSW’s direct action-oriented history and 
culture using words such as “physically harder and mentally 
stronger,”  “draw on every ounce of strength,” “tactical 
proficiency,” “train for war and fight to win,” “I’m never 
out of the fight,” and “execution will be swift and 
violent.”  These words set the foundation of what a SEAL 
believes, who he is and what he strives to be. 
Posted throughout the teams and associated NSW 
commands is this image: 
  
Figure 3.   U.S. Navy Seal Code(From Navy SEAL home page, 
2008) 
An abbreviated version of the ethos, it is designed to 
remind SEALs daily what it means to be a member of this 
small community.  It is meant to instill pride and 
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responsibility.  The SEAL is ever reminded through this 
image that his job, both on and off the battlefield, is to 
train for war and fight to win. 
C. TRAINING 
Multiple books, TV shows and articles have been 
produced over the years illustrating the rigors of SEAL 
basic training.  Known as BUD/S (Basic Underwater 
Demolition / SEAL), it is lauded as the most physically 
demanding military training in the world, a fact from which 
every SEAL gains a great deal of pride.  The physically 
exhausting aspect of BUD/S demands exceptionally fit 
personnel.  In addition to the physical necessities of the 
training, candidates must have the mental fortitude to 
persevere through the physical, emotional and psychological 
strain to which they are subjected.   In an attempt to 
increase their numbers, Naval Special Warfare has committed 
a great deal of energy and resources to not only training 
future SEALs but to finding and recruiting the “right” men.  
1. Recruitment 
Naval Special Warfare has attempted a number of 
refinements in the way they approach recruiting.  Ideas, 
such as simply increasing the numbers through the door, 
have proven ineffective.  There have been claims that 
recruiting primarily from northern states is the best 
course of action, since those individuals are used to being 
cold.  But this idea, and others like it, has been 
debunked, as exceptional men come from all parts of the 
United States.  The most recent refinement for recruiting 
is to increase the quality of recruits coming to BUD/S, not 
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the quantity.  This is being done by implementing a battery 
of psychological tests and evaluations to determine if the 
recruit has the mental fortitude necessary to complete 
BUD/S.  While these tests may give insight into how an 
individual may behave or react to a particular situation, 
they cannot measure what may be the most important quality 
of a future BUD/S student: his desire. As one senior 
enlisted leader within NSW stated, “The best measurement to 
determine a good candidate is BUD/S” (Licause, 2009).   
Still, the body pool must come from somewhere, so 
leaders in the community must concentrate efforts in some 
intelligent manner.  The age limit to attend BUD/S is 28 
years old; it is a young man’s game.  Waivers can be 
written, but they are rare.  To accomplish the desired goal 
of recruiting the most capable individuals, recruitment for 
enlisted SEALs is focused on young, capable athletes.  NSW 
is working with the National High School Athletic Coaches 
Association, attempting to use this network of coaches and 
organizations to get the word out about SEALs, and build 
interest in becoming a SEAL (Licause, 2009).  Exploiting 
demographic data already existing within the community, NSW 
recruiters are also working with USA Water Polo, USA 
Swimming, rugby organizations and wrestling organizations.  
In addition, while the demographics do not fully support 
it, the Navy and NSW put a great deal of resources towards 
advertising at the 2008 Ironman Triathlon World 
Championship held in Kailua-Kona, Hawaii (Licause, 2009).   
To further ensure enlisted success, Captain Duncan 
Smith put considerable effort into ensuring “candidates 
knew, really knew, what becoming a SEAL meant” (Smith, 
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2009).  They incorporated the SEAL Ethos into intra-Navy, 
also known as “in-fleet,” marketing plans and asked the 
Navy's ad agency to do the same. 
In the recent past, physical ability has been the 
primary focus of recruiters and the prime qualifier of 
recruits because it was lacking in most candidates. In 
March 2006, the pass rate on the SEALS Physical Screening 
Test (PST) at the Navy’s Great Lakes Training Facility was 
28%.  After a lengthy campaign by NSW flag leadership to 
have Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) make the PST mandatory 
for SEAL candidates before enlisting in the Navy, the pass 
rate rose to approximately 90%.4  
Several programs now exist to mentor and encourage 
potential SEAL recruits.  One very successful program was 
created to support the need for enlisted candidates to meet 
conditioning standards.  This program gave candidates the 
opportunity to spend time with SEAL operators is the Navy 
SEAL Fitness Challenge.  Started in 2006 as an NSW 
recruiting directorate initiative, NRC now funds and runs 
this as a national event.  Key to its success is direct and 
ongoing NSW involvement (Smith 2009). 
Recruitment for officers is almost unnecessary.  A 
form of self selection exists within the officer 
candidates.  Potential commissioned BUD/S students 
habitually exceed the standards of selection.  They 
routinely prove physically and mentally prepared for the 
rigors of BUD/S.  This exceptional preparation can likely 
be attributed to two factors; 1) these potential SEAL 
                     
4 SEAL Master Chief Vic Licause was the champion of this effort and 
many other SEAL recruiting aims. 
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officers are older and, therefore, more mature and capable 
of dealing with the expected hardships, and 2) they have 
seen the movies, the advertisements and are at least 
nominally familiar with the literature produced about 
SEALs, and are attracted by the recognized physical 
requirements.  This attraction to the SEALs has created a 
situation unusual in most of the military.  NSW leadership 
must make the determination who to turn away as candidates.  
In this sense, NSW leadership has come up with criteria to 
determine not only which candidate officer can make it 
through BUD/S, but also who will be the best officer for 
the community.  Different people on selection committees 
will obviously have different criteria, but after talking 
to an O–6 previously in charge of SEAL recruiting, it 
became evident what a general list for choosing officer 
candidates will likely include: maturity, athletic strength 
and team experience, focus5, and exceptional Physical 
Screening Test (PST) scores6.   
All this effort and the concentration of resources 
illustrate NSW’s desire to focus on the physical 
capabilities of recruits.  Intelligent recruits are common, 
                     
5 40 potential officer applicants were interviewed in three years by 
the O-6 interviewed.  Only eight were endorsed.  Two candidates with 
many of the right qualifications not endorsed were a former Marine 
officer with combat experience but marginal PT scores and a Stanford 
quarterback with an Ironman Triathlon background.  These were amazingly 
talented individuals in their own right, but each was comparing NSW 
with other disparate career options. 
6 The Captain interviewed saw these scores as different from 
“athleticism.”  It also incorporates focus.  An accomplished college 
wrestler is no shoe-in for the 500 yd swim.  He needs to work on it. 
The Olympic swimmer needs to train hard to run a sub 9 minute 1.5 mile. 
There are so many officer candidates that are exceptional; the PST 
becomes an effective filter or tool in reducing the applicant pool.  
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many enlisted men are coming in with bachelor’s degrees7, 
some even with master’s degrees.  But education aside, once 
in the SEAL Teams, professional knowledge is gained out of 
necessity in order to remain an effective part of the Team.  
Above all, physical capability is sought after and 
respected throughout the SEAL community. 
2. BUD/S 
Broken into three phases, this six-month school is a 
grueling screening and assessment process that routinely 
experiences 70% attrition.  First Phase is eight weeks of 
intensive conditioning; testing the candidates’ physical 
ability and mental toughness.  Much of this phase consists 
of daily early morning calisthenics, timed beach runs, 
timed open ocean swims, and timed obstacle courses.  In 
addition to these timed activities, there are untimed, but 
highly monitored, physical activities such as Log PT,8 rope 
climbs, buddy carry races, surf passage,9 and water 
competency tests.  With morning musters around 0430 and the 
morning calisthenics beginning at 0500, the candidates are 
active until dinner time at 1800.  They must then go back 
to their quarters and properly clean and maintain their 
gear, clean their rooms and prepare their equipment and 
                     
7 One third of enlisted BUD/S graduates have a college degree.  Fifty 
percent of the enlisted men in a recent graduating class had bachelor’s 
degrees.  
8 Log PT (Physical Training) consists of a five or six man team 
(known as a boat crew) conducting various physical activities, to 
include sit-ups, “push-ups” (bench press like exercise), over-head 
press, squats, running races, etc., all with a 300 pound, ten-foot long 
wooden pole, similar to a telephone pole. 
9 Surf Passage is an activity in which the boat crew paddles their 
Inflatable Boat, Small (IBS) (an eight foot long inflatable rubber 
raft) out past the surf zone (breaking waves) then back up to the 
beach, repeated “until the instructors get tired”.  
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uniforms for the next day.  This maintenance may go until 
2100 or 2200—the next day holds a similar routine for them.   
The swan song of First Phase is the infamous “Hell Week,” 
five days of physical endurance in which the candidates are 
allowed about four hours of sleep total.  Hell Week is a 
test of physical endurance, mental tenacity and true 
teamwork where two-thirds or more of every class quit or 
“ring the bell.”10  Physical discomfort and pain causes many 
to decide that it is not worth it. The miserable wet-cold, 
approaching hypothermia, will make others quit.  Some 
simply cannot imagine doing the same thing for the next 
three or four days.  Whatever the individual reasons, BUD/S 
students wishing to quit are not encouraged to stay, if 
they do not have the tenacity to do it now, no one can say 
they will obtain it on the battlefield. 
Those determined enough to complete Hell Week proceed 
to Second Phase.  This phase is eight weeks long and is 
where the BUD/S students learn open circuit (SCUBA) and 
closed circuit (bubbleless) diving.  This training is 
ostensibly to prepare future SEALs for a method of 
insertion or to conduct assaults against enemy ships or 
facilities.  While this phase is not as physically brutal 
as First Phase, students do fail out, failing dive physics 
tests, other academic challenges, or an inability to 
perform particular physical and job related requirements.  
Combat diving is the focus of the phase, with the last 
couple weeks of Second Phase consisting of multiple mock 
ship attacks.   
                     
10 To “Ring the Bell” is to quit.  It is a physical act by the 
student conducted by ringing a brass bell hanging in front of the 
instructors’ office.  The student rings the bell three times signaling 
the student’s desire to Drop on Request, or DOR. 
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Third Phase is nine weeks of land warfare/small unit 
tactics training.  Here BUD/S students learn weapons 
safety, marksmanship, land navigation, small unit tactics 
and demolitions.  The physical nature of BUD/S increases 
again, with daily physical training (PT), long runs, ruck 
sack runs and various other “creative” activities 
administered by the instructors.  A portion of the training 
is conducted on training grounds at and near Coronado, CA, 
the home of BUD/S.  For three weeks the students are sent 
to San Clemente Island for small unit tactics.  All aspects 
of the San Diego and San Clemente based training of Third 
Phase concentrate on physical fitness, marksmanship, land 
navigation and direct action missions against an enemy.  
Students may still be dismissed from the program for 
weapons and demolitions safety violations.  
D. SEAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING 
After BUDS is completed, trainees go through the U.S. 
Army Basic Parachute Training. From there, they go onto 
SEAL Qualification Training (SQT).  This is three months of 
advanced training, placing a large emphasis on land 
warfare, land navigation, close quarters combat, combat 
swimmer operations, marksmanship, demolition, urban 
warfare, and air operations (parachuting, heli-borne 
assaults, helicopter fast roping, helicopter rappelling).  
At no point in the initial training of a SEAL does he learn 
foreign culture, language, stability operations, Civil 
Affairs or other non-kinetic IW skills. 
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1. Pre-deployment Work Up / Task Unit Training 
Once formed into a Task Unit (TU), SEALs continue to 
receive intensive training to prepare them for the 
battlefield.  The blocks of training SEAL Task Units take 
part in vary in the order they are conducted.  This is 
primarily because of training cadre and training location 
availability.  The length of training also varies depending 
on the priorities of the community at the time, i.e. during 
the initial stages of Afghanistan and Iraq, Task Units 
dedicated considerably less time to diving operations 
(approximately a third of what was dedicated prior to 
September 11 2001).  Minor changes are common in the order 
of the following training blocks and additions and 
deletions of shorter courses, e.g. Advanced First Aid, may 
not be scheduled for a specific Team or even a specific 
coast (West Coast or East Coast).  That being said, the 
following is a generic list of the training a SEAL Task 
Unit participates in. 
a. Land Warfare 
This training block is often three to five weeks 
long.  It consists of marksmanship, mostly rifle, as well 
as land navigation, small unit tactics, Immediate Action 
Drills (IADs, the actions taken if the unit comes under 
enemy fire), raids, ambushes, heavy weapons and stand-off 
weapons training. 
b. Close Quarters Combat (CQC) 
Usually two weeks in length, this is the training 
necessary for an individual up to an entire Task Unit to 
enter a building and effectively move through and secure 
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it.  During this training, Task Units conduct small arms 
training, both rifle and pistol, on stationary, moving and 
multiple targets. 
c. Special Operations in Urban Combat (SOUC) 
Often known as Military Operations in Urban 
Terrain (MOUT), this two-week block concentrates on house-
to-house fighting and movement though hostile streets.  
This training has become of great importance with the 
amount of combat operations conducted in Iraq. 
d. Mobility 
Approximately two weeks in duration, this 
training focuses on the operations and maintenance of 
HMMWVs.  The training is done as individual vehicles and 
multivehicle detachments. 
e. Air Week 
Besides having helicopters throughout the work 
up, usually in-land warfare and SOUC, SEALs dedicate a week 
to fixed wing air operations.  This includes Static Line 
and Military Free Fall parachute jumps on to land and into 
water.  The SEALs also participate in “Duck Drops”, jumps 
with numerous men and up to four Combat Rubber Raiding 
Crafts (CRRC) or Zodiac rubber boats. 
f. Dive Training 
For many years, this was a three to five-week 
block of training.  With the predominance of SEALs fighting 
a land war, emphasis on the water operations was shortened, 
in some cases down to a week.  Recently, the community has 
rededicated efforts to this capability and now conducts up 
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to two to three weeks training that focuses on underwater 
navigation using a rebreather (bubbless) diving system. 
g. First Aid / Trauma 
A recent addition to an already over-loaded 
schedule, this one week training introduces the SEALs to 
advanced battlefield trauma treatment. 
h. Close Quarters Battle (Hand to Hand) 
A one week training regime (which has one week 
advanced courses if time allows) focusing on offensive and 
defensive measures of armed and unarmed fighting. 
2. Pre-Deployment Individual Training 
During the 12 to 18 month predeployment workup, SEALs 
also go to individual schools to learn specialized skills, 
such as Sniper, out-board motor repair, Range Safety 
Office, etc.  The classes SEALs go through are designed to 
better allow the SEALs to conduct their missions overseas.  
At no time does the Task Unit or individual SEAL undergo 
“Irregular” or “Unconventional” Warfare training.  A few 
SEALs have recently been given the opportunity to take 
language courses, but the extended time necessary for this 
(3–12 months) conflicts with training required to be a 
competent member of a SEAL team.  Any sort of cultural 
awareness or indigenous interaction techniques are usually 
learned on the job.  It is also important to note that the 
training blocks conducted and the emphasis of most all SEAL 
training is on short duration operations.  SEAL missions 
are, by in large, measured in hours, maybe days.  Adopting 
the adage, “Fight like you train, train like you fight”, it 
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seems SEALs train for, and should therefore fight, short 
duration, direct action oriented mission sets. 
E. HISTORY 
The history of the U.S. Navy SEALs is traced back to 
the Scouts and Raiders, Navy Combat Demolition Units, 
Office of Strategic Services Operational Swimmers, and 
Underwater Demolition Teams of World War II.   
The Scouts and Raiders originated as a joint force 
responsible for pre-invasion reconnaissance in preparation for 
amphibious assaults (Kapusta, 2000).  As Rear Admiral Richard 
Lyon said in his interview for The Frogmen of World War II: 
Our mission was to scout out beaches and 
waterways to determine if they were safe for 
amphibious landings, and then to lead the troops 
into safe channels to the beach. (Cunningham, 
2005, p.127) 
Later this mission was enlarged to include erecting 
markers for the incoming craft, taking offshore soundings, 
blowing up beach obstacles and maintaining communications 
between troops ashore and forces offshore (Naval Special 
Warfare Command, History n.d.).  In the Sino-American 
campaign in and around China, Scouts and Raiders formed the 
core of what was envisioned as a "guerrilla amphibious 
organization of Americans and Chinese, operating from 
coastal waters, lakes and rivers employing small steamers 
and sampans" (Naval Special Warfare Command, History, 
2008).  This group of Scouts and Raiders conducted 
intelligence collection and limited guerrilla warfare along 
the coast of occupied China.  This set the precedence for 
later SEALs to successfully conduct land based operations 
(Kelly, 1992, pp.55–58).  
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In the European Theater, Naval Combat Demolition Units 
(NCDU) blew eight complete gaps and two partial gaps 
allowing access to the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944.  
Suffering 52% casualties they managed to clear 700 yards of 
beach in two hours, and another 900 yards by the afternoon 
(Naval Special Warfare Command, History, 2008).   
The exhausting combat operations these forces 
conducted made it imperative they could safely use 
explosives under the harshest of conditions.  To ensure 
this was conducted safely and successfully Draper Kauffmann 
(later Admiral) was put in charge of NCDU’s explosives 
training.  Kauffmann placed unparalleled importance on 
physical fitness to ensure careless mistakes were not made 
out of exhaustion (Kapusta 2000, p.80, Kelly 1992, p.17).  
This intensive physical fitness became a cornerstone for 
Naval Special Operations, recognizable in today’s SEALs.  
The disastrous U.S. Marine amphibious landing at 
Tarawa, in which naval landing vessels were stuck on a reef 
500 yards off the coast, causing the unnecessary slaughter 
of almost 1,000 Marines, illuminated the importance of 
hydrographic reconnaissance and underwater demolition in 
preparation for amphibious landings.  In response, a total 
of 34 Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) were formed.  These 
“naked warriors,” wearing swim suits, swim fins and masks, 
saw action throughout the pacific in Eniwetok, Saipan, 
Guam, Tinian, Angaur, Ulithi, Pelilui, Leyte, Lingayen 
Gulf, Zambales, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Labuan, Brunei Bay, and 
Balikpapan on Borneo  (Naval Special Warfare Command, 
History 2008).   
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With the outset of the Korean War, UDT personnel were 
assigned to Special Operations Group, or SOG; their numbers 
eventually reaching a combined strength of 300.  UDTs 
successfully conducted beach and river reconnaissance, mine 
sweeping operations, demolition raids on railroad tunnels 
and bridges, and infiltrated guerrillas behind enemy lines 
from the sea.  Harkening back to their original purpose, 
UDT personnel conducted pre-invasion preparations for the 
landing at Inchon.  Scouting mud flats, marking low points 
in the channel, searching for mines, and clearing fouled 
propellers during the invasion, UDT personnel assisted in 
the successful amphibious assault.   
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy informed The 
Department of Defense that he wanted the U.S. Navy to 
commission a unit capable of unconventional and commando 
warfare (Kelly, 1992).  President Kennedy’s purpose for 
this force was to have men who “could fight the dirty 
guerrilla wars” expected in America’s future (Dockery, 
2004, p235).  This new group would concentrate, as per 
guidance of the President, on a three-faceted mission: 
1. Develop a specialized Navy capability in 
guerrilla / counter-guerrilla operations to 
include training of selected personnel in a wide 
variety of skills 
2. Development of doctrinal tactics 
3. Development of special support equipment 
(Dockery, 2004) 
The Navy turned to their Underwater Demolition Teams 
to act as the cornerstone for this new “commando” unit.  
 
 34
From these teams and from those recruited throughout the 
active duty Navy, the United States Navy Sea Air Land 
(SEAL) Teams were formed. 
As Vietnam escalated, SEALs and UDTs were introduced 
to the theater in an advisory role. SEAL advisors 
instructed the Provincial Reconnaissance Units and the Lien 
Doc Nguoi Nhia, the Vietnamese SEALs, in clandestine 
maritime operations (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete 
History from World War II to the Present 2004, pp.426–427, 
523–524).  Eventually, in 1966, SEALs arrived in Vietnam 
with the sole purpose of conducting direct-action missions. 
Operating out of Nha Be, in the Rung Sat Special Zone, 
SEALs conducted raids, ambushes and clandestine operations 
in what was considered one of the most hostile regions of 
South Vietnam (Dockery, SEALs In Action 1991,pp.82–83, 89).   
Still, being a separate entity, the UDTs acted 
independently of the SEALs, seeing combat in Vietnam while 
supporting the Amphibious Ready Groups. When attached to 
these riverine groups, the UDTs conducted operations with 
river patrol boats and, in many cases, patrolled into the 
hinterland as well as along the riverbanks and beaches in 
order to destroy obstacles and bunkers.  
The post-Vietnam Navy determined it necessary to 
severely decrease the number of both UDTs and SEALs.  UDTs 
felt this reduction in ranks most severely.  By 1983, all 
remaining Underwater Demolition Teams were decommissioned, 
with the remaining UDT warriors being fully incorporated 
into the SEAL Teams. 
As the SEALs gained notoriety and acceptance within 
the Navy, their mission and purpose was modified to more 
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thoroughly define what these naval commandos were to do.  
Naval Warfare Information Publication 29–1 was produced to 
detail the SEAL Mission Profile: 
(1) Primary: To develop a specialized capability to conduct 
operations for military, political, or economic purposes 
within an area occupied by the enemy for sabotage, 
demolition, and other clandestine activities conducted in and 
around restricted waters, rivers, and canals, and to conduct 
training of selected U.S., allied and indigenous personnel in 
a wide variety of skills for use in naval clandestine 
operations in hostile environments. 
(2) Secondary: To develop doctrine and tactics for SEAL 
operations and to develop support equipment, including 
special craft for use in these operations. 
(3) Tasks: Tasks may be overt or covert in nature. 
 (a) Destructive tasks-These tasks include clandestine attacks 
on enemy shipping, demolition raids in harbors and other 
enemy installations within reach; destruction of supply 
lines in maritime areas by destruction of bridges, 
railway lines, roads, canals, and so forth; and the 
delivery of special weapons (SADM) to exact locations in 
restricted waters, rivers or canals. 
 (b) Support tasks-The support tasks of SEAL Teams include 
protecting friendly supply lines, assisting or 
participating in the landing and support of guerrilla and 
partisan forces, and assisting or participating in the 
landing and recovery of agents, other special forces, 
downed aviators, escapees and so forth. 
 (c) Additional Tasks: 
  1. Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence 
collection missions as directed. 
  2. In friendly areas train U.S. and indigenous personnel 
in such operations as directed. 
  3. Develop equipment to support special operations. 
  4. Develop the capability for small boat operations, 
including the use of native types. 
Figure 4.   Naval Warfare Information Publication 29–1 (From 
Dockery, 1991) 
Although the SEALs were introduced to Vietnam as 
advisors and maintained limited advisory roles throughout, 
the majority of mission carried out through WWII, Korea and 
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Vietnam were direct action missions.  The tasks dictated in 
NWIP 29–1 include training guerrillas, partisans and 
indigenous personnel.  This is considered UW and the SEALs 
did, and continue to do, quite well at it.  Using UW the 
way they understood it, it was often done as a means, the 
ends being to engage the enemy directly.  In Vietnam, and 
recently in Iraq, SEALs have used UW as a method of entry 
into a warzone to allow SEALs to get into the fight; UW is 
not an end unto itself (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete 
History from World War II to the Present 2004, p.332). 
F. UNIT ORGANIZATION 
Since their inception, the core element of the SEAL 
Teams has been the platoon; a 16–man fighting force that 
deploys to forward located Naval Special Warfare Units.11  
Recently this has undergone some changes.  Now, two 
platoons are placed together, working as a single Task 
Unit.  When deployed, depending on what Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) to which they are deployed, a task 
unit may have Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel 
attached (such as is in CENTCOM) or a Special Boat Team 
(SBT) detachment assigned to them (as is common in EUCOM 
and PACOM).   Each SEAL Team has three task units as well 
as headquarters personnel.   
                     
11 The three Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU) are located in Guam 
(NSWU-1), Stuttgart, Germany (NSWU-2), and Bahrain (NSWU-3). 
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Figure 5.   NSW SEAL Team Chain of Command 
Four SEAL Teams are under each of the two Naval 
Special Warfare Groups (NSWG):  NSWG–1 in Coronado, CA and 
NSWG–2 in Virginia Beach, VA.12  These two groups, along 
with NSWG–3 (Undersea Command based in Coronado, CA), NSWG–
4 (Special Boat Teams Command based in Virginia Beach, VA) 
and Naval Special Warfare Command (training and advanced 
training based in Coronado, CA) answer to Naval Special 
Warfare Command (WARCOM), currently housed in Coronado, CA. 
Naval Special Warfare Group THREE has a very unique 
responsibility and capability.  Tasked with clandestine 
infiltration and undersea operations, NSWG–3 is in charge 
of the SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) or mini–subs, including 
the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) (Global 
Security.com, 2005). 
                     
12 NSWG-1 oversees SEAL Teams 1, 3, 5, and 7.  NSWG-2 oversees SEAL 
Teams 2, 4, 8, and 10. 
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Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR is tasked with 
training and equipping of Special Warfare Combatant-craft 
Crewmen (SWCC) as well as development and assessment of 
Special Warfare boats (NSWG–4, 2000).  Within their 
inventory are the Mark V (a large “speedboat”), RHIBs 
(rigid hull inflatable boats), Special Operations Craft, 
Riverine (SOC-R), with other vessels currently undergoing 
testing and evaluation. 
Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG) is 
NSW’s Research and Development command.  It is tasked with 
the development of NSW tactics, equipment, and techniques. 
 
Figure 6.   NSW Chain of Command 
With approximately 2,500 active duty SEALs, Naval 
Special Warfare has long been the smallest community in 
SOCOM.  But the list of supporting personnel, supporting 
assets and responsibility has greatly increased the size of 
the community.  Still perceived as a small command, NSW is 
growing its numbers.   
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G. WHERE TRAINING AND CULTURE HAVE BROUGHT THEM 
If NSW were to actively move away from their DA-
oriented force, more harm than good would be done.  As has 
been discussed in this chapter, SEALs are recruited, 
trained and organized to be a fighting force.  To alter the 
organizational culture to something else would, as earlier 
stated, create an organizational schizophrenia.  Extensive 
research has been done on top performing organizations, and 
one of the commonalities they all had was a strong, well 
defined culture (Peters and Waterman, 1982).  To have an 
identifiable culture has proven to be a powerful asset.  
The SEALs should recognize where the past 48 years have 
taken them and continue to capitalize on their strengths.  
They should continue to embrace and promote the direct 
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IV. CASE STUDIES—HISTORIC EMPLOYMENT OF SEALS 
For the purposes of this paper, it will not be 
necessary to draw out intensive details of numerous case 
studies.  Instead, the cases, some single operations with a 
single purpose, others a single operation with multiple 
purposes, and still others (Vietnam) presented as an over 
arching view of all operations conducted during that time, 
will be dissected using seven factors surrounding each 
case.  These factors are:  
• Purpose / Target, Means of Insertion  
• Method of Engagement 
• Duration of Mission 
• Outcome 
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved 
• Reason for Success or Failure of each operation.   
By using these criteria as a means of study, the 
intent is to give a condensed illustration of what SEALs 
have done and currently do.  For wars such as Vietnam and 
the current War on Terror, the use of case studies is 
admittedly faulty.  It would be impossible to study each 
and every SEAL mission.  For Vietnam, the paper will 
examine the predominant types of missions executed.  For 
Afghanistan, it will look at an operation that received 
particular attention (Operations Red Wings, which resulted 
in the death of 11 SEALs).  For the Iraq case studies, it 
will investigate two cities, Ramadi and Habbaniyah 
referencing the common operations executed in each area. 
These two towns were chosen because they are viewed as 
successes in the counterinsurgency effort.  Hopefully this 
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approach will give a fair breadth of direct and indirect, 
as well as successes and failures experienced by the SEALs 
over the past 48 years. 
Success and failure of Special Operations is often 
hinged on the minutest of details.  Chance and luck can 
often determine a mission’s outcome reflective of the 
universal acceptance of “Murphy’s, Law” among military 
personnel.  But through careful analysis of missions, one 
can often find steps or missteps in planning, breakdowns or 
breakthroughs in communications or the availability of 
vital resources that proved the key to success or by its 
absence resulting in failure.  In an effort to quantify 
what these factors are Lucien Vandenbroucke and William 
McRaven each wrote a book asserting the factors that cause 
failure or success, respectively. 
In his book Perilous Option, Lucien Vandenbroucke 
describes the factors associated with Special Operations 
that cause failure.  Vandenbroucke asserts that five 
factors: faulty intelligence, insufficient interagency or 
interservice coordination and cooperation, inadequate 
information and advice provided to decision makers, wishful 
thinking by decision makers, and over control by leadership 
far removed from the theater (Vandenbroucke, 1993, p.8), 
are responsible for the failure of SO.  He makes this 
determination by examining four strategic special 
operations which exacted a heavy toll in human life and 
damage to U.S. prestige (Vandenbroucke 1993, p152).  He 
hypothises that if a mission can eliminate all of these 
shortfalls the likelihood of success increases 
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significantly.  Many of the failures presented in the 
following case studies reflect Vandenbroucke’s elements of 
failure   
In his book SPECOPS, William McRaven explains the 
factors that ensure Special Operations (particularly raids) 
succeed.  These factors are: Surprise, Speed, Security, 
Repetition, Sense of Purpose, and Simplicity.  Only when 
these factors are present can a small group of men obtain 
relative superiority over the enemy (McRaven, 1995).  
McRaven states that if we understand these factors for 
mission success we can better plan special operations to 
improve the chances of victory (McRaven, 1995, p2).  By 
using case studies from the beginning of the SEALs 
(Vietnam) to present day (Afghanistan and Iraq) a “trend” 
reflecting the type of operations SEALs most often engage, 
successfully, will hopefully become apparent.  Peter Paret 
outlines qualities that are necessary for an effective 
theory in his book Understanding War.  One of the qualities 
is using examples from the past that can be understood, and 
remain relevant, today (Paret 1992,p103) (McRaven 
1995,p381).  Using these factors as a foundation of 
analysis, nine case studies will be analyzed.  If the 
military understands the successes and failures of the 
past, it will better understand what is happening today, 
with the goal of better preparing for the future. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
1. Vietnam—March 1962—March 1973 
• Purpose/Target.  The initial mission for SEALs in 
Vietnam was military advisor to South Vietnamese 
special forces, the LDNN (Vietnamese equivalent 
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to the UDT or SEALs) and Provisional 
Reconnaissance Units13 (PRUs) (Dockery, Navy 
SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to 
the Present, 2004) (Edwards, 1991) (Nadel and 
Wright, 1994).  The PRUs fell under the much 
debated, criticized and misunderstood Phoenix 
Program, a program to use locals to identify and 
neutralize the leadership and infrastructure of 
the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, or the 
Viet Cong.  The emphasis on this mission quickly 
fades and SEALs primarily conducted direct action 
missions to include ambushes, reconnaissance 
missions, enemy personnel abduction (snatches, or 
as LCDR (Ret) Scott R. Lyon calls it, “flat-out 
kidnap the Viet Cong Leadership” (Dockery, Navy 
SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to 
the Present, 2004, p.269)), raids, and prisoner 
rescue operations (Edwards, 1991) (Nadel and 
Wright, 1994).  
• Means of insertion.  Working out of firebases 
(today often called the SEALs most often inserted 
by foot patrol or helicopter.  Holding to their 
maritime roots, and working in predominately 
riverine environment the SEALs also made great 
use of patrol boats and indigenous craft. 
                     
13 PRUs were paramilitary organizations made up of local militia and 
foreign mercenaries from Cambodia and Laos.  They were funded by the 
CIA and trained by U.S. military personnel.  They were assigned to a 
province, preferably their home province; the idea being they would 
fight harder for their own turf (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete 
History from World War II to the Present 2004, p.427).  
 45
• Method of engagement.  Usually working with what 
they could carry in such a harsh environment, the 
SEALs typically engaged the enemy with small arms 
and claymore mines 
• Duration of mission.  As mentioned, the SEALs 
worked out of fire bases.  They would typically 
patrol out to an ambush site and lie up and wait, 
or they would conduct raid operations against a 
specified target.  The missions were usually 6–12 
hours in duration 
• Outcome.  Out of the hundreds of missions the 
SEALs conducted in Vietnam, it would be difficult 
to list every success and failure, but throughout 
the war they had mixed results.  Even some of 
their “successes” consisted of days of planning 
netting only one or two enemy KIA or a weapons 
cache with a couple rifles (Hoyt 1993). 
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved.  As 
previously mentioned SEALs initially entered 
Vietnam as military advisors to the South 
Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, Hoi 
Chan (Edwards, 1991) from the Chieu Hoi Program,14 
and the Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia, or LDNN, the 
Vietnamese SEALs. 
                     
14 Chieu Hoi Program allowed Viet Cong and ex-North Vietnamese Army 
members to receive amnesty from South Vietnam.  These individuals 
usually provided intelligence or armed resistance against the enemy 
(Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to the 
Present, 2004). 
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• Reason for success or failure.  SEAL successes in 
Vietnam are usually attributed to violence of 
action (Wright, 1994), surprise, tenacity, and 
audacity.  In addition, the SEALs consistently 
displayed an uncommon will to succeed, they used 
unorthodox approaches (everything from dressing 
as the enemy, or dressing in blue jeans and no 
shoes, to the way they conducted ambushes) and 
they were given unorthodox equipment (Stoner 
machine guns, silenced weapons) and unorthodox 
training.  These last three attributes are 
pointed out by Lamb and Tucker in United States 
Special Operations Forces as being significant 
requirements for successful SOF. Intelligence 
collection by the SEALs for the SEALs has been 
pointed to as a success. But, oddly, while SEALs 
were able to collect effective intelligence many 
failures are attributed to a lack of, or flawed, 
intelligence, provided to them; a factor noted by 
Vandenbrouke in SO failures.  More Vandenbrouke 
factors relevant to the overall war effort was 
inadequate information and advice provided to 
decision makers and micromanagement by leadership 
far removed from the theater, as well, this 
factor can not be directly attributed to 
individual SEAL failures.   
2. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989 
• Purpose / Target.  Three sixteen-man SEAL 
platoons with Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) 
members, plus a seven-man C3 element,  were tasked 
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with disabling (explicitly told not to destroy) 
Manuel Noriega’s private Lear jet at Paitilla 
Airport, Panama City, Panama.  The disabling of 
the aircraft was to deny Noriega one of the many 
escape routes available to him.  Also, the SEALs 
were tasked with placing obstacles on the runaway 
in order to deny it being used by any other 
aircraft (Nadel and Wright 1994). 
• Means of insertion: The SEALs inserted on 14 x 
CRRCs (Combat Rubber Raiding Craft, or Zodiac F–
470s), towed and escorted by a Special Boat Unit 
26 Patrol Boat.  This is a much larger force than 
SEALs typically work with. Originally, the force 
was designed to be smaller, but additional tasks 
and security concerns encouraged the assault team 
to grow to its considerably large size.   
• Method of engagement: As the SEALs conducted a 
hasty patrol (run) from the south to the north 
end of the runway they were ambushed from 
Noriega’s hanger.  Small arms fire was directed 
at them.  They returned fire with small arms and 
AT–4 anti-tank weapons.  A C–130 was dedicated to 
the mission, but for unknown reasons the AFCCT 
was unable to establish radio communications 
(Nadel and Wright, 1994). 
• Duration of mission: The mission was intended to 
be five hours.  It turned out to be 37 hours long 
(Nadel and Wright, 1994). 
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• Outcome: Three SEALs were killed on the runway 
with a fourth dying in route to medical care in 
the U.S.  Seven SEALs were wounded, five 
seriously (Nadel and Wright, 1994). 
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: 
None, the SEALs (and CCT) conducted the mission 
unilaterally. 
• Reason for success or failure:  With such a large 
force (55 SEALs plus Air Force Combat Control 
Team members), surprise was virtually impossible 
for the force. Paitilla airfield is in downtown 
Panama City.  Such a large assault force, moving 
in such a confined area, made it impossible to 
assure surprise.  It is believed several 
Panamanians saw this large force land at the 
beach and begin their patrol across the airfield 
(Nadel and Wright, 1994,pp.207–208). In addition 
to the loss of surprise, poor planning 
contributed to the failure.  Decision makers 
placed a higher premium on ensuring Noriega’s 
aircraft was not damaged than on the lives of 
U.S. military on the ground.  Originally told 
they would execute the mission at 0100, the 
execution timeline was moved one hour earlier, 
negating the option for a more cautious approach 
that would have otherwise been used as per SEAL 
doctrine (Nadel and Wright, 1994).  Another 
possible reason for failure is misuse of force.  
U.S. Army Rangers rehearse, and routinely 
conduct, airfield assaults.  They should have 
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been used.  Use of a SOF to conduct a relatively 
large scale conventional (perhaps hyper-
conventional15) mission should be avoided at all 
times. Vandenbroucke’s factor of wishful thinking 
(or as Nadel and Wright address it, “poor 
assumptions”) on the part of military decision 
makers can also be attributed to the outcome of 
the mission.  There was an underestimation of the 
enemy’s resolve to fight and knowledge of the 
terrain (Nadel and Wright 1994).  The SEALs were 
put at a terrible disadvantage before they ever 
launched on the mission. 
3. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989 
 Purpose/Target:  The SEALs were tasked with 
conducting a combat swimmer operation against the 
Panamanian Patrol Boat Presidente Poras in Balboa 
Harbor.  The purpose of destroying this vessel 
was to deny Noriega a means of escape (Hoyt 
1993).  (Later in the military action this group 
was tasked with the capture of Noriega’s private 
yacht (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History 
from World War II to the Present, 2004).   
 Means of insertion: The combat swimmer operations 
was conducted by 4 SEALs, split into two swimmer 
pairs. 
                     
15 Hyperconventional is a term coined by Dr. Hy Rothstein.  The term 
references forces that conduct conventional operations, specifically 
DA, with exceptional skill and / or precision (Rothstein 2006).   
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 Method of engagement: Each swim pair had MK 138 
“Haversacks” containing 20 pounds of C4 explosive 
(Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History from 
World War II to the Present, 2004). 
 Duration of mission:  The mission consisted of a 
two-hour dive, with an additional two hours’ 
surface transit. 
 Outcome:  The Presidente Porras was destroyed and 
Noriega’s yacht captured. 
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved:  
None, the mission was conducted solely by SEALs. 
 Reason for success or failure:  There were a 
couple factors responsible for the SEALs success.  
One was stealth and use of an unexpected avenue 
of approach; underwater; in McRaven’s words 
surprise.  This avenue of approach, unlike the 
airfield approach, did not allow any observation 
of the mission execution.  Also present was a 
sense of purpose (after all, everyone knew Manuel 
Noriega was evil) and simplicity.  The dive 
profile for the mission was far easier than any 
dive profile encountered during the SEALs’ combat 
swimmer training.  As one member of the dive team 
described, “Our mission lasted about four hours 
and was the exact type of mission SEALs train for 
every day” (Nadel and Wright, 1994, p.205).  
Repitition can also be credited for the success.  
At the time, SEALs placed a great priority on 
combat swimmer training.  The countless dives of 
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greater difficulty before this actual combat 
swimmer operation greatly contributed to the 
successful outcome. 
4. Grenada–Operation Urgent Fury–25 October 1983 
 Purpose/Target:  In Operation Urgent Fury SEALs 
were assigned three missions: 
1) Secure the Governor’s residence in order to 
rescue Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, and 
evacuate him.   
2) Capture Radio Free Grenada.   
3) Conduct beach reconnaissance in support of the 
U.S. Marine Corps landing at Pearls Airfield.  
 Means of insertion: Eight SEALs were parachuted 
into the ocean with two Boston Whaler fiberglass-
hulled boats in order to link up with a U.S. Navy 
destroyer (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete 
History from World War II to the Present, 2004).  
Sixteen SEALs fast roped out of Blackhawk 
helicopters on to the Governor’s Residence.  The 
beach reconnaissance in support of the USMC 
landing was conducted from CRRC “Zodiacs” and two 
SEAFOX speedboats (Adkin, 1989). 
 Method of engagement: As is typical with SEAL, 
and SOF, operations, they only brought what they 
could carry or fast rope.  This limited their 
fire power to small arms and grenades.  They were 
able to call in close air support from AH–T1 
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SeaCobras. The element assigned to capture Radio 
Free Grenada conducted an uneventful helicopter 
insertion.   
 Duration of mission: The Governor’s Residence was 
expected to take one to two hours. In actuality, 
because of underestimating the Grenadians will to 
fight and the fire power the Grenadians were able 
to mass, the Governor’s Residence mission took 26 
hours.  The beach reconnaissance mission took 
four hours from launch to mission complete.  The 
Radio Free Grenada mission was expected to take 
approximately two to three hours (author’s 
approximation based on mission objectives).  In 
actuality, SEALs stayed on target for nearly 24 
hours (Nadel and Wright, 1994). 
 Outcome: Four SEALs died in initial water jump, 
due in part to their predicted day jump becoming 
a night jump and in part to an unexpected squall.  
The Governor was rescued after a considerable 
fire fight with Grenadian Defense Forces.  In 
turn, the SEALs were rescued by a Marine armor 
element.  The SEALs conducted successful beach 
reconnaissance missions which diverted 400 
Marines from an amphibious landing to a heli-
borne assault (Adkin, 1989).  The SEALs who were 
sent to the radio station discovered it was, in 
fact, a radio transmitter site.  After repelling 
numerous enemy forces the group evaded to the 
water.  Four out of the eight sent to capture the 
radio tower were injured.  Three additional beach 
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recons were conducted and several shipboardings 
were conducted in support of Admiral Metcalf’s 
desire for sea dominance. 
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: 
None.  Three SEAL elements conducted unilateral 
operations. 
 Reason for success or failure:  For the most 
part, Grenada was a failure in leadership and 
communications.  There was extraordinary 
overcontrol by leadership far removed from the 
area.  Also, loss of the element of surprise due 
to delays by Atlantic Fleet played a disastrous 
role on numerous missions.   One of the most 
glaring failures was the complete lack of 
intelligence, and what little intelligence they 
did have was seriously flawed (the radio station 
was actually a transmitter site, the Grenadians 
had a great will to fight, the Grenadians had 
much more weapons and capability than reported).  
Grenada brought to light the insufficient 
interagency and interservice 
coordination/cooperation.  This abysmal 
interservice performance, from assets not being 
able to communicate to units not knowing where 
each other are, spawned a concentrated effort to 
increase interservice capabilities. 
5. El Salvador 
 Purpose / Target: As part of the U.S. strategy 
for Central America, U.S. military personnel, 
 54
including SEALs, were sent to El Salvador to 
train and advise Salvadorian military in counter-
insurgency efforts against the FMLN (Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front). 
 Means of insertion: Military personnel would be 
transported by military or civilian aircraft to 
El Salvador.  Once in country they would travel 
by 4 x 4 SUVs and helicopter throughout their 
districts and throughout the country.  The 
personnel were there to work for the U.S. 
Military Group (MILGROUP). 
 Method of engagement: They were trainers.  These 
personnel advised on everything from strategy for 
senior leaders to small unit tactics for recruits 
(Willwerth 1983). 
 Duration of mission: Personnel would go for one-
year tours.  Many personnel would conduct 
multiple return tours. 
 Outcome: LCDR Albert Schaufelberger (one of the 
SEALs who participated in this program) was 
killed by the Central American Revolutionary 
Workers' Party (PRTC), a sub-group of Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).  He was 
picking up his girlfriend at the University of 
San Salvador after her classes.  This was a daily 
routine he had unfortunately followed.  
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: The 
Salvadorian Army and Navy. 
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 Reason for success or failure: El Salvador as a 
whole is a shining success story.  LCDR 
Schaufelber’s loss was a tragedy. Complacency can 
be blamed in part for his murder (he kept the 
same time line and drive pattern, and he removed 
the bullet proof window because his car’s air 
conditioner was broken).  Vandenbrouke’s and 
McRaven’s factor do not have relevancy in this 
case study, as the tragedy may be viewed as 
personal mistakes.  Of note, this may point to 
the need to have at least two SEALs (or a SEAL 
and another SOF member) work together to keep 
each other diligent.  SF operators pride 
themselves on the choice of mature soldiers 
capable of performing individually in austere 
environments.  It is not suggested that SEALs are 
not mature enough to accomplish this, but perhaps 
they work better with a “swim buddy.” 
6. Desert Storm—Deception Operation—24 February 1991 
 Purpose/Target: SEALs were tasked with deceiving 
Iraqi forces into believing the main U.S. 
invasion effort would be an amphibious landing 
into Kuwait. 
 Means of insertion: Eight SEALs used CRRCs to get 
within a practical distance of the shore.  They 
then transitioned into the water to swim ashore. 
 Method of engagement: Each man carried a 20 pound 
Haversack full of C4 explosives.   The Haversacks 
were placed at various intervals on the beach.  
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Once the timed explosions erupted the SEALs swept 
the beach with small arms, .50 caliber and 40mm 
grenade fire. 
 Duration of mission: The entire mission took 
three hours 
 Outcome: Several Iraqi divisions were diverted to 
counter the “amphibious landing” (Dockery, Navy 
SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to 
the Present 2004).  This allowed the actual 
invasion force to move more rapidly than expected 
and to encounter less resistance than if the 
diversion operation was not executed. 
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: 
None, mission was conducted unilaterally. 
 Reason for success or failure: The SEALs success 
was gained by absolute surprise.  Repetition is 
another of McRaven’s factors that may be given 
credit.  SEALs frequently conduct over the beach 
rehearsals.  While a standard training mission 
may not be conducted to emplace explosives on the 
beach, the concept of clandestine movement up to 
and on the beach is the same.  
7. Afghanistan–Operation Red Wings—28 June 2005 
 Purpose/Target: A four man SEAL element was sent 
to provide Special Reconnaissance (SR)in order to 
positively identify the enemy personality, Ben 
Sharmak—(aka Ahmad Shah) (Luttrell, 2007).  This 
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was in order to disrupt enemy activities in the 
Kunar Province of Afghanistan.  
 Means of insertion: The SEALs fast-roped from a 
helicopter onto a mountain top above the village 
the enemy was expected to be in. 
 Method of engagement: The SR was conducted using 
high powered optics.  Once compromised the SEALs 
engaged the Taliban forces with their M–4 rifles. 
 Duration of mission: The mission lasted two days.  
For the one survivor, Luttrell, it lasted and 
additional five days (Luttrell, 2007). 
 Outcome: Three of the initial four-man element 
were killed in the engagement with the Taliban.  
Eight more SEALs responding as the quick reaction 
force (QRF) died when their U.S. Army 160th SOAR 
helicopter was shot down.  Eight U.S. Army 160th 
crewmen died in that crash as well.  One SEAL, 
Luttrell, was recovered. 
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: 
None 
 Reason for success or failure: The mission failed 
because they were compromised.  Another factor 
for failure was faulty decision making once the 
SEALs encountered three goat herders.  It is 
believed these goat herders alerted the Taliban 
to the SEALs presence.  The QRF failed because 
the enemy was alerted and was prepared for rescue 
helicopters flying in during daylight. 
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8. Iraq–Ramadi–Combat FID–Sniper Overwatch 
 Purpose / Target: The primary mission was combat 
FID.  Once the Iraqi force they partnered with 
was capable, the SEALs took them on combat 
missions within the city.  In the SEAL Team’s 
approach to fully support the U.S. Army’s 
strategy in Ramadi, they undertook a relatively 
unique mission.  The SEALs began conducting 
patrols to contact.  This may be considered a 
misuse of SOF, but the SEAL Task Unit Commander 
felt the unique time called for extraordinary 
efforts (Couch 2008).  The SEALs also conducted 
numerous sniper overwatch missions, providing 
sniper cover to patrolling SEALs, Marines and 
U.S. Army.  The purpose of these patrols to 
contact and other missions was to identify and 
eliminate armed insurgents. 
 Means of insertion: The SEAL’s targets were all 
within the city which surrounded their base.  
Because of this close proximity the SEALs would 
insert by HMMWV or, preferably, conduct a foot 
patrol right out the gates of the base (Couch 
2008). 
 Method of engagement: The SEALs conducted FID 
with the Iraqi Army, training them for a few days 
and then go out on combat patrols. When engaging 
the enemy the SEALs relied on small arms, 
grenades, and Carl Gustav recoilless rifles.  If 
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necessary, the SEALs could call in Army armor as 
a QRF or as additional firepower (Couch, 2008). 
 Duration of mission: The FID training took about 
three hours a day.  When the Iraqis and SEALs 
went out on a FID combat patrol, they expected to 
be out approximately two to three hours.  This 
was extended if the patrol was engaged by the 
enemy.  Sniper overwatch missions typically 
lasted eight to 12 hours; in a couple cases they 
ended up being 36 hours (Couch, 2008). 
 Outcome: Over the two years it took to control 
Ramadi, two SEALs were killed, Marc Lee and Mike 
Monsoor.  Working closely with U.S. Army and 
Marines, the SEALs eliminated many insurgents, 
and permanently disrupted numerous cells.  The 
Ramadi Police and Iraqi Army Scouts the SEALs 
trained proved to be a capable and effective 
fighting force.  The SEALs’ willingness to 
conduct daytime patrols just as their 
conventional brethren did effectively developed 
very close conventional-SOF bonds. 
 Host Nation units involved: The SEALs developed 
and worked alongside the Iraqi 1st Brigade, 7th 
Division, Special Missions Platoon (Couch, 2008).  
The SEALs also worked alongside Iraqi Police 
elements (Couch 2008). 
 Reason for success or failure: Flexibility and 
cooperation were the keys.  In building bonds 
with the U.S. Army the SEALs were able to support 
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the conventional strategy and greatly contribute 
to the successes.  Analyzing McRaven’s tenets, we 
see three factors contributed to SEAL successes 
in Ramadi.  The first was security.  Ensuring 
their planning and objectives were kept quiet and 
only told to their Iraqi counterparts immediately 
before departing for the missions ensured 
success.  Also repetition, in rehearsals and in 
similar missions, promoted efficiency and 
increased everyone’s capabilities.  Working 
alongside Iraqi Police and Army, and establishing 
a trust and brotherhood directly contributed to 
building a sense of purpose, both on the SEALs 
part and on the part of the Iraqis. 
9. Iraq–Habbaniyah 
 Purpose/Target: Throughout 2007 the SEALs based 
in Habbaniyah, a town southwest of Fallujah, were 
given the near exclusive job of training Iraqi 
Police recruits. 
 Means of insertion:  There was none.  The SEALs 
lived on the base the training was performed. 
 Method of engagement:  As trainers, the SEALs 
worked with the new Iraqi Police training them in 
marksmanship, small unit tactics, patrolling and 
close quarters combat.  The training was 
conducted up to five days a week, around six or 
seven hours a day. 
 Duration of mission:  Each training class was 
three weeks long. 
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 Outcome:  In the seven months the author was in 
country, when the push for increased numbers was 
the biggest, 1,400 police recruits were trained. 
 Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: Al-
Anbar Police 
 Reason for success or failure:  Success was 
generated by both the SEALs and Iraqi leadership.  
Most of this success can be attributed to a sense 
of purpose.  The SEALs did not particularly 
relish their job as trainers.  They would prefer 
to have been conducting DA missions, but the 
mission from Special Operations Task Force WEST, 
the SOF Headquarters for the west of Iraq, was to 
train local police forces. Because of this the 
SEALs took their task to heart and conducted it 
with great success. 
B. MISUSES 
SEALs have displayed an impressive ability to adapt to 
changing environments.  This is witnessed in their ability 
to train more than 1,400 Iraqi Police. The FID in 
Habbaniyah has been heralded as a great success, but using 
SOF to conduct basic marksmanship, patrolling and house 
clearance comes at a cost.  When SEALs conduct operations 
they do not have a comparative advantage in, they are used 
in a less than optimal way.  If the SEALs were unavailable, 
or there was too great of a ratio of students to SEAL 
instructors, U.S. Marines or U.S. Army personnel were used.  
These conventional elements did just as good of a job as 
the SEALs.  In some cases they may have been less capable, 
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but that could be easily changed by additional preparation.  
There is a tremendous opportunity cost for using SOF in a 
conventional role, while the missions the SOF could be 
doing go undone.  As both Christopher Lamb and Elliot Cohen 
state, SOF is not a replacement for conventional forces, 
and where conventional forces can be used SOF should not be  
(Cohen, 1978) (C. Lamb, Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles 
and Missions, 1995).   
The Paitilla Airfield case study from Operation Just 
Cause also illustrates this point.  Airfield takedown is 
not something SEALs train for.  Two SEALs who were sent to 
conduct reconnaissance of the airfield prior to the 
invasion recommended using stand off weapons to disable 
Noriega’s jet.16  For unknown reasons it was mandated that 
Noriega’s jet was not to be damaged (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A 
Complete History from World War II to the Present, 2004), 
an example of micromanagement and unnecessary constraints 
put on a force from a far removed decision maker.  SEALs 
can conduct an airfield takedown, and they did in fact 
accomplish their goal, but at an unnecessarily high cost.  
The smartest course of action would have allowed the C–130 
to simply disable the jet with a single shot.  With that 
option not being allowed another element, Army Rangers, 
could have been used for this, even though it was an 
“amphibious operation.” Rangers train for just such a 
mission and should have been the choice once the mission 
began to grow larger than the capabilities of one SEAL 
Platoon.  
                     
16 In 1999 the author met one of the two SEALs sent to do this.  The 
details surrounding this may have been lost over time, as no references 
have been found discussing this proposal.   
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The failure of LCDR Schaufelberger and that of 
Operation Red Wings were not misuses of SOF, nor were they 
failures of the organization.  These can be attributed to 
“operator error” or, more appropriately, as a success for 
the enemy.  Since SOF as a whole work in small elements, 
the possibility always exists they will encounter or be 
surprised by a larger, more prepared adversary.  
The cases studied further illustrate that, while SEALs 
can do various missions, their tendency and specialty is to 
conduct actions aimed at apprehending, engaging or 
eliminating an enemy.  Short duration, direct engagement is 
the culture of the SEALs and what the SEAL community 
continues to do better than any other force their size.  
C. SUMMARY 
These case studies are not all inclusive.  SEALs have 
done numerous unreported jobs and numerous missions that 
cannot be discussed in an unclassified paper.  Furthermore, 
in Iraq particularly, SEALs are conducting non-kinetic, CA 
type operations.  What do the case studies examined show as 
successful uses of Navy SEALs? 
From the case studies analyzed it appears the most 
successful missions SEALs conducted were short duration 
missions conducted directly against the enemy.  Many of 
these cases suggest SEALs have greater impact and 
operational success when their mission is in support of 
conventional forces.  From the case studies, and the other 
readings surrounding these studies, it is suggested SEALs 
are at their best in direct action oriented, physically 
demanding, and high-risk missions.  These case studies show 
that SEALs have a comparative advantage in direct action 
over indirect action. 
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V. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE; SYNTHESIS OF CULTURE, 
HISTORY AND TRAINING 
A. SOF AND DIRECT ACTION 
Undoubtedly for every case study previously mentioned, 
another Special Operations Force can be cited as doing a 
similar job.  But the argument is not that only SEALs can 
do SO direct action missions, but that SEALs are the best 
SOF to conduct such missions.  Chapter III illustrated how 
the SEAL heritage is based on physically demanding 
operations and DA missions.  A preponderance of their 
missions have been violent actions directly against the 
enemy.  From this, as well as their training, the direct 
action oriented culture has become a recognized mainstay of 
their organization.  Other SOFs have established their own 
cultures and capabilities over the years as well. 
The U.S. Army Special Forces, called “Green Berets” 
are unmatched in their level of cultural and linguistic 
training (Martinage, 2008).  While capable of conducting 
almost any of the SOF core tasks, including direct actions, 
they are the recognized leaders in Unconventional Warfare 
(Martinage, 2008).  Special Forces were born out of the 
World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  Personnel 
selected into the OSS were chosen more on their proclivity 
to “go native” in Europe than on their physical 
characteristics.  A primary consideration was language 
fluency, since the major tasking was organizing and 
interacting with partisan/guerrilla networks within Europe 
(Simons).  Taking its cue from the OSS, Special Forces were 
originally designed to train, advise and lead guerrilla 
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forces mainly against the Soviet Union (Waller, 1994).  
Recognizing the successes of the OSS and its ability to 
effectively work with partisan groups, language fluency and 
cross-cultural ability became defining requisites for SF 
(Simons, p.31). 
The Army Rangers can trace their heritage back to the 
prerevolutionary war period of the King Phillips War and 
the French and Indian War.  Their modern history is from 
World War II, where they were created as a commando unit 
based on the British Commandos (David W. Hogan, 1992).  The 
Rangers were periodically decommissioned and 
recommissioned, always as a highly proficient infantry unit 
(Kapusta, 2000).  In the days of Army draw down, it was 
thought the Rangers would be the sole SOF retained by the 
Army, as their proclivity for direct, sustained engagement 
against the enemy (direct action) was more in line with the 
conventional army than SF’s unconventional warfare  (Adams, 
1998).  Whether they are Elite Infantry or Commandos, the 
Rangers were recognized as a highly capable U.S. Army 
Battalion capable of large scale hyper-conventional 
missions. 
B. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
A term originating in the Economics realm, Comparative 
Advantage is often used in the study of Special Operations 
Forces, comparing the various forces in order to determine 
who is best suited for specific missions. 
As defined by the Business 2000, Comparative Advantage 
means: A (group) should specialize in producing a good (or 
service) at which it is relatively more efficient (Business 
2000, 2008).  To expound on this idea and emphasize the 
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military aspect of it, the theory holds that organizations 
should specialize in the execution of missions they can 
conduct more efficiently than another force. An 
organization is said to have a comparative advantage in the 
execution of those missions. 
An additional term often seen and used is Absolute 
Advantage.  This is when one organization can conduct an 
activity more effectively or better than any other 
organization (Winters and Paro, 1994).   
Although holding an absolute and comparative advantage 
does not guarantee mission success, they provide tangible 
guidance and conditions for proper use of SEALs or other 
SOF.  It is not espoused that SEALs have an absolute 
advantage at DA.  The argument is SEALs do have a 
comparative advantage in this mission set.  
SEALs and other SOF can all do direct and indirect 
action missions.  But is it wise for all of these forces to 
be doing all the missions along the Spectrum of Special 
Operations?  Can the likelihood of success increase by an 
intelligent division of labor?  SEALs are selected and 
trained for direct action, violent missions.  Because of 
their culture, training and history they have a comparative 
advantage at DA over other SOFs.  SEALs have a comparative 
advantage at small unit, precise, surgical special 
operations against specific targets.  Rangers can do direct 
action, but they carry a much larger footprint, with less 
“precision” than SEALs.  Additionally, Ranger roles and 
missions are very much set in standard operating 
procedures, contributing to inflexibility.  SEALS on the 
other-hand have an inherent flexibility, due in part to 
 68
their small unit size.   SF can conduct DA, but their 
training in irregular warfare and indirect action gives 
them a comparative advantage over the SEALs in UW missions.  
While SEALs can conduct UW missions, and have often devised 
ways of solving unorthodox problems, their skills and 
training are not directly aligned with such action.    
If Army Special Forces already exists why should SOCOM 
and NSW leadership strive to make the SEALs more “SF-like?”  
This would make both SF and SEALs less effective.  They 
would compete for many of the same resources and missions, 
at the same time they could be diluting their unique 
capabilities.  If both organizations (SF & SEALs) are vying 
to be the “Jack of All Trades,” they will in essence be 
experts in nothing.  The United States military will have 
reduced multiple fields of expertise and tactical 
proficiency in its attempt to make all forces do all 
things. 
C. LEADERSHIP MUST RECOGNIZE THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The enemies of the United States are using more 
ingenuity in the ways they attack us.  Because of this 
variety of threats, it is important for the military to 
maintain a variety of specialized capabilities.  To 
encourage all forces to focus on all threats may result in 
not being positioned to counter any threats effectively. 
The leadership of the various SOFs must recognize each 
unit’s unique comparative advantage and insist that they 
excel in it.  SF has a comparative advantage at UW 
missions.  Special Forces leadership should be the vanguard 
of reigniting the UW heritage in SOCOM.  SOCOM has been 
dominated by hyperconventional thinkers in recent years but 
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this should only further motivate Army SF to reinforce 
their UW roots and maintain it as their primacy (Rothstein 
2006).  The Rangers have a comparative advantage at larger 
scale DA missions, to include airfield seizure, raids, 
movement to contact, and airborne assaults; this should 
continue to be their primary focus.  The SEALs have a 
comparative advantage in small scale, short duration DA 
missions.  These include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance 
and maritime missions.  For all the reasons stated in the 
previous chapters, SEALs should be focused on these 
missions.  Having the right force conduct the right mission 
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VI. STRATEGIC UTILITY AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT 
The comparative advantage of an organization gives 
insight into the most effective way to employ that 
organization.  Chapters three, four and five have 
demonstrated that the SEALs’ comparative advantage lies in 
direct action missions.  Taking this comparative advantage 
and applying it to the U.S. military strategies of the 
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, 
National Military Strategy and National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, which all call for U.S. forces to 
directly engage an enemy, it is apparent how the highly 
disciplined SEALs can strategically contribute to the 
defense of the nation.    
A. THE SEAL STRATEGIC UTILITY 
This study has illustrated how the comparative 
advantage of SEALs favors short term direct action 
missions.  This is based on training, culture and previous 
missions conducted by the SEALs.  In addition, they were 
originally formed to conduct operations around restricted 
waters, rivers, and canals (NWIP 29–1) contributing to the 
maritime niche they retain as part of their culture and 
lineage.   
Based on this study, the strategic utility of SEALs is 
as a land and sea based short duration DA force, excelling 
in raids, ambushes, hostage rescue and HVT abduction.  They 
have the capability to conduct a broad range of SOs, to 
include FID, civil affairs, and tribal engagement, but that 
is not where they hold the greatest advantage over other 
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SOFs.  As Admiral Olson, Commander Special Operations 
Command, stated in his article in Security Affairs, “The 
direct approach is decisive in its impact” and “Capturing 
and killing adversaries will always be necessary”  (Olson 
Spring, 2009).  There will always a need for DA within 
SOCOM.  For this purpose it is important for the SEALs to 
maintain this precision capability. 
B. RETAIN DA/SR AS PRIORITY MISSION 
As long as an active enemy remains on a battlefield, 
or the United States has adversaries that must be watched 
or removed, NSW should retain SR / DA as their primary 
mission.  In recent years, SEALs have received some 
criticism because of their DA focus.  This criticism comes 
primarily from U.S. Army counterparts and U.S. Marine 
elements that have fully, and rightfully, embraced the 
indirect efforts of counter-insurgency.  As previously 
stated, a number of military leaders believe the indirect 
approach is the most useful employment of SOF, and should 
therefore be the primary mission. But, as discussed 
earlier, the SEALs come from a culture based on SR / DA.  
This is where the SEALs have historically placed their 
efforts, and it is where they should continue to 
concentrate their efforts, especially considering the 
enduring requirement to conduct DA missions.  
Another reason for NSW to retain its direct action 
focus is they can provide decision makers with a capable 
force to fill the gap between conventional forces and 
Special Mission Units (SMU).  When decision makers want to 
strike an enemy effectively and precisely, but do not want 
the large footprint involved with conventional forces they 
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can turn to the SEALs to proficiently execute the mission.  
Similar to Special Forces inextremis Force (CIF), SEALs are 
prepositioned around the globe at NSW Units.  They can 
quickly be put into action by COCOMs, without compromising 
the very special capabilities of the SMUs. Employing SEALs 
in this capacity provides the COCOM with an additional land 
and maritime asset quickly to handle important situations 
with regularly aligned units.   
The current Task Unit composition makes the SEALs an 
exceptionally effective forward deployed force, capable of 
gathering, analyzing and acting on intelligence.  Even 
though the SMUs have somewhat greater capabilities, it is 
arguable the SMUs are not as readily available and should 
be focused on other specific high priority missions.  The 
greatest example of why SEALs provide a force capable of 
bridging the SMU–GPF cap is their flexibility and ability 
to respond, which has proven effective in past 
circumstances.   When it was discovered in the spring of 
2002 that Zawahiri would be at a medical clinic in Gardez, 
Afghanistan, it was decided to use a SMU to apprehend him.  
This decision was made even though a “White SOF” element 
was only “five minutes away” from the clinic (Vistica, 
2004).  The delay, resulting from the perceived need to use 
the SMU for the mission, was ample time for Zawahiri to 
safely depart the area. 
Similarly, a “White SOF” element was denied permission 
to go to a mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan to apprehend 
Mullah Omar.  While the team was located at a base just 
minutes away, U.S. military commanders followed strict 
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protocol and called in a SMU. Based hundreds of miles away, 
it took them several hours to arrive in Kandahar. By that 
time, Omar had disappeared (Vistica, 2004).  
C. THE MARITIME NICHE 
Two-thirds, roughly 70%, of the world is covered by 
water (Joint Command, 2008).  It is estimated that by 2010 
80% of the world’s population will live within 60 miles of 
the shoreline. Currently three-quarters of the world's 
mega-cities (cities of 10 million or more people) are by 
the sea (Save the Sea 2006).  Such factors make it likely 
that future conflict will take place within the vicinity of 
the shoreline.  Numerous nations important to the United 
States have substantial coastlines, to include: North 
Korea, China, Somalia, Nigeria, Iran and Indonesia.  In 
addition, non-state actors occupy this maritime expanse as 
well. 
Operating within this vast maritime arena are criminal 
and terrorist organizations, exploiting the sea lanes for 
both movement of illicit cargo and for hijacking cargo 
ships.  Using fairly simplistic means, such as machine 
guns, explosive laden vessels, and vessels used as RPG 
(rocket propelled grenade) and missile launching platforms, 
terrorist are capable of waging relatively inexpensive and 
effective war that can have crippling affects on the global 
economy. (The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
2005).   
Areas with political and economic instability, such as 
coastal regions and littorals in ungoverned or under-
governed regions, provide havens for those conducting 
illegal activities.  Criminal and terrorist groups 
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understand this, and take full advantage of it (Joint 
Command, 2008). In accordance with The National Defense 
Strategy, the U.S. military must be prepared to act against 
these criminals to ensure global freedom of movement and 
support an environment conducive to international order 
(Rumsfeld, 2005).  With the world’s largest navy, it is 
inherent for the United States to act, when possible, as a 
regulating force against maritime threats. 
One of the tools the U.S. can employ in this fight is 
the Navy SEALs.   Working from the sea or land, SEALs are 
the ideal force to access areas used by the criminal 
entities.  By conducting SR, emplacing sensors, conducting 
tagging and tracking operations, conducting personnel 
apprehensions (or removal), or countering pirates to 
protect U.S. assets and personnel, SEALs can contribute to 
the collection of vital intelligence and the cessation of 
illicit activity around the world.   
As previously mentioned, the SEALs have moved away 
from their maritime roots the past eight years.  The 
foreseen reduction of forces in Iraq is an opportunity for 
the force to reacquaint itself with their water borne 
roots.  It is possible for the SEALs to retain their 
capability as a land force, but it is time for them to 
reinvest in their maritime niche, which was once the 
essence of their organization.   
Early on in their existence, the SEALs established 
their niche as the maritime SOF.  Recognizing they have an 
established maritime niche, it is imperative SEALs continue 
to fight to retain that niche (Wilson 1989).  To 
successfully retain relevancy and strategic utility the 
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SEALs must adhere to James Wilson’s tenets for 
organizational survival.  “They must seek out tasks that 
are not being or cannot be performed by others.”  “They 
must avoid taking on tasks that differ significantly from 
those that are at the heart of the organizations mission,” 
and finally they must “fight organization’s that seek to 
perform [their] tasks” (Wilson, 1989,p.189–190).  The 
introduction of Marine Corps Special Operations Command 
(MARSOC) and some of their capabilities threaten the 
primacy of SEALs as the U.S.’s “go-to” force for special 
operations conducted from amphibious platforms or in the 
littorals.17 
The SDV community has never relinquished the primacy 
of this mission, and they are the recognized experts in NSW 
undersea warfare.   But the majority of SEALs have let this 
perishable skill atrophy, and their primacy may come into 
question.  The niche is theirs to lose if they do not 
reconnect with this capability.  Now is the time for NSW to 
dedicate time and resources to return to their maritime 
dominance.   
D. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE (SFA), TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT AND 
INDIRECT ACTION 
The SEALs have demonstrated a capability to 
effectively support “By, with and though” mission.  SEALs 
have executed hundreds of raids against enemy targets in 
                     
17 The 1st and 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB), under 
MARSOC, are headquartered at Camp Pendleton, CA, and Camp Lejeune, NC.  
They are intended for worldwide deployment.  Each MSOB is commanded by 
a Marine Major and capable of deploying task-organized expeditionary 
Special Operations Forces to conduct special reconnaissance, direct 
action and missions in support of the geographic combatant commanders 
(U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command 2006). 
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conjunction with host nation (HN) Iraqi and Afghan forces.  
In fact, they proved such a capacity towards this mission 
they were asked to take the lead on training Iraqi forces 
throughout the al Anbar region in 2007 and 2008. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, and afterwards to a 
lesser degree, NSW forces routinely conducted FID (now 
being referred to as Security Force Assistance, or SFA) 
around the world.  This gave SEALs practical training in 
various environments, increased the capabilities of nations 
friendly to the United States, and proved extremely 
valuable in times of conflict18. 
Currently in Iraq, SEALs are conducting a great deal 
of SFA with Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police in Fallujah, 
Ramadi, Habbiniyah and throughout Western Iraq.  When the 
author was in Fallujah in 2007, U.S. SOF could only conduct 
bilateral operations.  Only in extreme circumstances were 
U.S. forces authorized to conduct unilateral operations.  
To meet this criterion SEALs conducted what has been termed 
“Combat FID;” training counterparts well enough to take 
them into combat.  This differs from other FID or SFA 
missions the SEALs have done.  Previously, SEALs trained HN 
forces in peace time to increase that HN’s capabilities.  
More recently, SEALs have trained Iraqi forces and sent 
them off without going into combat with them (the Police 
Academy in Habbiniyah is an example of this).  
                     
18 SEALs have been conducting Joint Combined Exchange Trainings 
(JCETs) with the Polish GROM for many years.  So when SEALs found 
themselves working near GROM elements in Iraq, it was a natural 
decision to conduct combined operations.  This improved both forces 
capabilities and proved a very useful union.   
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SEALs are capable of this SFA mission, but it is a 
difficult mission for SEALs.  This is not to say they 
cannot do it; however, even NSW leadership will agree, no 
SEAL joined to conduct SFA (Williams 2008,p3).  Admiral 
Winters, Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, admits 
“SEALs joined to conduct SR/DA, and NSW must continue to 
pursue those important DA mission…but we are going to stay 
as flexible as the enemy and do what is most important to 
defeat him now” (Williams, 2008), meaning conduct SFA. 
From 2006–2008, the author and many of his peers were 
assigned to conduct Tribal Engagement activities.  Some of 
these Tribal Engagements were conducted to help a local 
leader improve his tribe’s security or to better defend 
against al Qaeda.  These engagements proved successful and 
where consistent with the SOF UW methodology.  
Unfortunately, some of these engagements were solely to 
“collect environmentals” or to see “If the Sheik needs 
anything.”19  This may be good practice in conducting a 
counterinsurgency, but it is not the best use of a SEAL 
force.  If no other force has previously talked to, or is 
currently engaged with, the Sheik, or there is no 
possibility for any other coalition force to meet with the 
Sheik (due to extreme distances from forward operating 
bases, or other hardships other forces are not able to 
overcome), then SEALs may be an appropriate force.  But to 
use SEALs to gather environmentals by talking with local 
leaders when other coalition elements have easy access to 
the Sheik is a misuse of a limited force. 
                     
19 These were reasons given to the author as well as Task Unit 
Commanders that worked in Western Iraq after the author left.  To 
“collect environmentals” means to go gather general information about 
an area and “get a feel” of what is going on. 
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Still, SFA and tribal engagement is unavoidable for 
SEALs, but NSW leadership should always be mindful of the 
SEALs’ comparative advantage for DA and only use SEALs for 
these UW missions when DA missions are not needed or other 
forces are unavailable.  SEALs are a limited force.  
Because they can do most things does not mean they should 
do all things simultaneously.  SOF military leadership must 
recognize this and use these specialized forces wisely.  
Comparative advantage, specified niches and proven 
capabilities should be taken into account before other 
peripheral tasks are assigned to a DA focused force.  The 
question from the introduction to this paper is still 
valid, “Is this what they should be doing, or are they 
doing it merely because they can?”  It is vitally important 
not to use precious resources “because you can,” but 
rather, use them for their greater strategic advantage.  
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The current battle the United States is in will 
continue to be a long-term irregular campaign (Gates, 
2009).  In an article to Foreign Affairs magazine, 
Secretary of Defense Gates notes the U.S. needs a military 
that can kick down doors as well as clean up the mess 
afterwards (Gates, 2009).  The military must not overly 
fixate on the SECDEF’s comment of cleaning up, even 
rebuilding, afterwards.  They must maintain a balanced 
approach and the “ability to kick down the door.”  It is 
important for policy and decision makers to remember they 
should not, and can not, simply exchange a direct 
capability with an indirect one (Cropsey, 2009).  Our 
enemies have shown adroitness at attacking us where we do 
not foresee or are unprepared.  Because of this, it can be 
deduced that a concentrated effort by the military in one 
direction would welcome an attack from the other.  If the 
DoD as a whole overcompensates for their ill prepared 
irregular warfare capability, the U.S. will find itself 
challenged by enemies (both conventional and 
unconventional) who recognize this weakness and are capable 
of exploiting it (Cropsey, 2009). 
SOCOM must retain balance throughout its forces.  They 
must not over compensate and completely refocus on indirect 
action.  Instituting new ideas is not an evil or unwise 
thing, but must be done with tempered enthusiasm.  To over 
steer too sharply in an attempt to modify the dominant SEAL 
culture will damage the capacity of SOCOM to expertly 
execute DA missions across the globe (Cropsey, 2009).  
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A. A TEMPERED APPROACH 
Special operations forces are a strategic asset and must 
continue to be treated as such (C. Gray, 1999).  SOCOM must 
make tough decisions on how to best prepare these strategic 
assets for employment.  It would be difficult, and 
foolharded, to argue that the U.S. military only needs a 
direct action strategy.  But there must be tempered realism 
in the desire to incorporate only indirect action to the 
strategic outlook of America.  A balanced approach is 
needed (Olson Spring, 2009). 
B. WHAT SEAL LEADERSHIP HAS LEARNED 
The current war has brought a large amount of 
attention to the SEALs and has given SEAL leadership a 
tremendous education in the preparation and execution of 
war.  This knowledge can be leveraged by senior SEAL 
leadership for future planning.  By ensuring they have 
unparalleled expertise as the maritime force of choice for 
the military, and by retaining their DA capabilities on 
land, future campaign and operational planners will have a 
clear understanding of how and where to use the SEALs.  
With a clear understanding of the concept of strategic 
utility, Naval Special Warfare forces will be properly 
employed in future military actions.  This will ensure the 
missions they perform are appropriate SEAL missions and can 
have direct and positive effects in support of the United 
States’ National Military Strategy. 
C. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Terror is likely to remain a threat in the foreseeable 
future.  It may become, like Dick Couch proclaims in 
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Sherriff of Ramadi, that terror will be similar to illegal 
drugs, something we never eradicate, but requires constant 
attention.  For this reason, SEALs will always have a 
mission of removing terrorist leaders and tenaciously 
chasing terrorists across the globe.  This constant 
vigilance will systematically erode the terrorists’ ability 
to operate (Couch 2008).  This task is often seen as the 
domain of special mission units (SMUs), but SMUs are 
extremely limited.  The “vanilla” or “white” SOF assets, 
specifically SEALs, can provide a responsive means of 
dealing with this threat. 
Terrorism is akin to cancer.  Like cancer there are 
multiple measures that must be taken to eliminate the 
disease.  Some of the measures are non-invasive.  For 
cancer these measures are nutrition, rest and 
pharmacological.  For terrorism these are the activities 
surrounding civil affairs, psychological operations, and 
“nation building.”  But invasive measures must also be 
taken and the deadly tumor removed.  For cancer this is the 
work of the skilled surgeon, armed with the scalpel he uses 
with precision.  For the military, the highly trained SEALs 
are the surgeon and the scalpel.  In order to ensure this 
capability remains a precision tool, SEAL mission focus 
should remain direct action in nature with a very good 
understanding of how the "kinetic scalpel of a surgical 
operation" should be used (Smith, 2009).  And just as 
important, they must understand when a not-so-sharp scalpel 
can adversely affect the indirect effort.  Therefore, this 
skill must remain as sharp as possible to ensure success 
(Smith, 2009). 
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The U.S.’s approach to all future conflicts must be 
balanced, where both indirect, and direct action are used 
(Maxwell 2004).  The Navy SEALs are a force that has been 
bred to conduct direct action missions.  To ensure this 
capability remains as precise and reliable as possible they 
must continue to persue their comparative advantage and 


















The mission sets unique to SOCOM, or the tasks which 
SOCOM forces can uniquely conduct in certain conditions and 
standards are: 
A. DIRECT ACTION 
These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale 
offensive actions conducted as a special operation in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and 
which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, 
destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated 
targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in 
the level of physical and political risk, operational 
techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use 
of force to achieve specific objectives. Activities within 
DA include the following: 
(1) Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults. These are 
operations designed to achieve specific, well-defined and 
often time-sensitive results. They are sometimes beyond the 
effective strike capabilities of conventional force 
elements.  
(2) Standoff Attacks. These are attacks by weapon 
systems or through IO. When targets can be sufficiently 
damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat 
forces, these attacks can be performed as independent 
actions. 
(3) Terminal Attack Control and Terminal Guidance 
Operations. Using global positioning systems, laser 
designators, beacons or other means SOF personnel provide 
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terminal attack control (TAC) to aircraft to grant weapons 
release clearance.  Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO) 
relay to aircraft additional information regarding a 
specific location or target. 
(4) Recovery Operations. These are operations 
conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and 
return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to 
national security.  These operations employ unconventional 
tactics and techniques, clandestine search, possible 
indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground 
combat elements. 
(5) Precision Destruction Operations. These are 
operations in which collateral damage must be minimized, 
requiring highly sophisticated weapons and/or timed 
detonation of specific amounts of explosives placed in 
exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision 
destruction operations can be conducted against targets 
where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first 
strike success or when the contents of a facility must be 
destroyed without damage to that facility. 
(6) Anti-Surface Operations. These are operations 
conducted against adversary maritime surface targets. These 
include, but are not limited to, visit, board, search, and 
seizure operations, which are shipboarding operations to 
board and seize cooperative, uncooperative, or hostile 
contacts of interest (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, pp II–4—
II–6). 
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B. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE (SR)WASN’T FORMATTED 
Special Reconnaissance are reconnaissance and 
surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to 
collect or verify information of strategic or operational 
significance, employing military capabilities not normally 
found in conventional forces. SOF’s highly developed 
capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, 
worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and 
sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other 
forces or assets. Activities within SR include the 
following: 
(1) Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations 
conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic, 
geological, and meteorological information.   
(2) Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that 
involve locating and attacking targets of opportunity, 
e.g., adversary material, personnel, and facilities in 
assigned general areas or along assigned LOCs. Armed 
reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of 
attacking specific identified targets. 
(3) Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations 
conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target 
to determine the most effective employment of weapons.  
(4) Poststrike Reconnaissance. These operations are 
undertaken for the purpose of gathering information used to 
measure results of a strike (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, 
ppII–6—II–7).   
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C. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 
These are operations that involve participation by 
civilian and military agencies of a government to assist 
another government to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Both conventional 
and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID 
missions. SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity 
is to assess, train, advise, and assist Host Nation (HN) 
military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that 
require their unique capabilities.  Successful FID missions 
can lead to strategic successes for U.S. foreign policy 
(Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p II–7). 
D. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) 
These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of 
military and paramilitary operations, normally of long 
duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, 
equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an 
external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can 
either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant 
commander’s overall theater campaign, or as an independent 
campaign.  From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to 
develop and sustain these supported resistance 
organizations and to synchronize their activities to 
further U.S. national security objectives. SOF units do not 
create resistance movements.  They advise, train, and 
assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence 
to conduct UW, or guerilla warfare, and when required, 
accompany them into combat. UW includes, but is not limited 
to, the following activities: 
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(1) Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and 
paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, 
predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or 
hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an 
insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla 
warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the 
existing government or an occupying power as well as 
destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities. 
(2) Subversion. These operations are designed to 
undermine the military, economic, psychological, or 
political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The 
clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the 
underground elements perform the bulk of the activity. 
(3) Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act 
or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct 
the national defense of a country by injuring or destroying 
any national defense or war material, premises, or 
utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage 
selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile 
capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and 
material. 
(4) Intelligence Activities. These activities assess 
areas of interest ranging from political and military 
personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and 
adversary forces.  SOF perform intelligence activities 
ranging from developing information critical to planning 
and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities 
and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces. 
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(5) Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These 
operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating 
unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms. UAR operations 
are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and 
support military and other selected personnel as they move 
from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas 
under friendly control (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, pp II–
7—II–8). 
E. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT) 
These are operations that include the offensive 
measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to 
terrorism. SOF’s role and additive capability is to conduct 
offensive measures within DOD’s overall combating terrorism 
efforts. SOF conduct CT missions as special operations by 
covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. SOF’s 
activities within CT include: 
(1) Intelligence Operations. These are operations to 
collect, exploit, and report information on terrorist 
organizations, personnel, assets, and/or activities.  
(2) Network and Infrastructure Attacks. These are 
operations that involve preemptive strikes against 
terrorist organizations with the objective of destroying, 
disorganizing, or disarming terrorist organizations before 
they can strike targets of national interest. 
(3) Hostage or Sensitive Materiel Recovery. These are 
operations conducted to rescue hostages and/or recover 
sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring 
capabilities not normally found in conventional military 
units.  
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(4) Non-Kinetic Activities. These are actions that are 
focused on defeating the ideologies or motivations that 
spawn terrorism by non-kinetic means. These could include, 
but are not limited to, PSYOP, IO, CA operations, UW and/or 
FID (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p.II–9). 
F. COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION (WMD) 
CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, 
render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of 
CP are to prevent the acquisition and use of WMD and their 
delivery systems.  SOF focus on counterforce tasks and 
conduct CP missions as special operations by covert, 
clandestine, or low visibility means  (Joint Publication 3–
05, 2003, p. II–10). 
G. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (CAO) 
These are activities which enhance military 
effectiveness by focusing efforts to minimize civilian 
interference with military operations and limit the adverse 
impact of military operations on civilian populations and 
resources. CA give commanders the capability to coordinate 
and provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to 
meet the life-sustaining needs of a civilian population.  
CA activities include establishing and conducting a 
military government or civil administration within 
operational areas until civilian authority or government 
can be restored.  These activities are planned and 
conducted by CA and involve application of functional 
specialty expertise in civil sector disciplines normally 
the responsibility of civil government.  CA operations are 
predominantly joint, interagency, and multinational in 
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nature and are conducted through or with indigenous 
populations, authorities and institutions, international 
organizations, and NGOs (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p 
II–10). 
H. PSYOP 
These are planned operations that convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behaviors favorable to the JFC’s objectives (Joint 
Publication 3–05 2003, p. II–12).  
I. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
IO involve actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while defending one’s 
own information and information systems. IO may be 
conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range 
of military operations, and at every level of war. Major 
capabilities include computer network operations, 
electronic warfare, operational security, PSYOP, and 
military deception. Beyond intelligence support, other 
capabilities include counterintelligence, physical 
security, information assurance, public affairs (PA), and 
CMO (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p II–12—II–13). 
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